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Rational herd behaviour and informationally eﬃcient security prices have long
been considered to be mutually exclusive but for exceptional cases. In this paper we
describe the conditions on the underlying information structure that are necessary
and suﬃcient for informational herding and contrarianism. In a standard sequential
security trading model, subject to suﬃcient noise trading, people herd if and only
if, loosely, their information is suﬃciently dispersed so that they consider extreme
outcomes more likely than moderate ones. Likewise, people act as contrarians if and
only if their information leads them to concentrate on middle values. Both herding
and contrarianism generate more volatile prices, and they lower liquidity. They are
also resilient phenomena, although by themselves herding trades are self enforcing
whereas contrarian trades are self-defeating. We complete the characterization by
providing conditions for the absence of herding and contrarianism.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D80, D82, G10, G14.
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In times of great economic uncertainty, ﬁnancial markets often appear to behave frantically,
displaying substantial price spikes as well as drops. Such extreme price ﬂuctuations are
possible only if there are dramatic changes in behaviour with investors switching from
buying to selling or the reverse. This pattern of behaviour and the resulting price volatility
is often claimed to be inconsistent with rational traders and informationally eﬃcient asset
prices and is attributed to investors’ animal instincts. We argue in this paper, however,
that such behaviour can be the result of fully rational social learning where agents change
their beliefs and behaviour as a result of observing the actions of others.
One example of social learning is herd behaviour in which agents switch behaviour (from
buying to selling or the reverse) following the crowd. So-called “rational herding” can occur
in situations with information externalities, when agents’ private information is swamped
by the information derived from observing others’ actions. Such “herders” rationally act
against their private information and follow the crowd.1
It is not clear, however, that such herd behaviour can occur in informationally eﬃcient
markets, where prices reﬂect all public information. For example, consider an investor with
unfavorable private information about a stock. Suppose that a crowd of people buys the
stock frantically. Such an investor will update his information, and upon observing many
buys, his expectation of the value of the stock will rise. At the same time, prices also adjust
upward. Then it is not clear that the investor buys — to him the security may still be
overvalued. So, for herding private expectations and prices must diverge.
In models with only two states of the world, such divergence is impossible as prices
always adjust so that there is no herding.2 Yet two state models are rather special and
herding can emerge once there are at least three states. In this paper we characterize the
possibility of herding in the context of a simple, informationally eﬃcient ﬁnancial market.
Moreover, we show that (i) during herding prices can move substantially and (ii) herding
can induce lower liquidity and higher price volatility than if there were no herding.
Herd behaviour in our set-up is deﬁned as any history-switching behaviour in the direc-
tion of the crowd (a kind of momentum trading).3 Social learning can also arise as a result
of traders switching behaviour by acting against the crowd. Such contrarian behaviour is
the natural counterpart of herding, and we also characterize conditions for such behaviour.
Contrary to received wisdom that contrarian behaviour is stabilizing, we also show that
1See Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) for early work on herding.
2With two states the price will adjust so that it is always below the expectation of traders with favourable
information and above the expectation of those with unfavourable information irrespective of what is
observed. As we show, with more than two states, this strict separation no longer applies.
3We are concerned with short-term behavior. In the literature, there are also other deﬁnitions of herding;
see Section 4 for a discussion.
1contrarian behaviour leads to higher volatility and lower liquidity, just as herd behaviour.
The key insight of our characterization result is that social learning in ﬁnancial markets
occurs if and only if investors receive information that satisﬁes a compelling and intuitive
property. Loosely, herding arises if and only if private information satisﬁes a property that
we call “U-shaped.” An investor who receives such information believes that extreme states
are more likely to have generated the information than more moderate ones. Therefore,
when forming his posterior belief, the recipient of such a signal will shift weight away from
the center to the extremes so that the posterior distribution of the trader is “fat-tailed.”
The recipient of a U-shaped signal thus discounts the possibility of the intermediate value
and as a consequence will update the probabilities of extreme values faster than an agent
who receives only the public information.
Contrarianism occurs if and only if the investor’s signal indicates that moderate states
are more likely to have generated the signal than extreme states. We describe such signals
as being “Hill-shaped.” The recipient of a Hill-shaped signal always puts more weight on
middle outcomes relative to the market so that this trader’s posterior distribution becomes
“thin-tailed.” He thus discounts the possibility of extreme states and, therefore, updates
extreme outcomes slower than the market maker.
We follow the microstructure literature and establish our results in the context of a
stylized trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In such models, the
bid and ask prices are set by a competitive market maker. Investors trade with the market
maker either because they receive private information about the asset’s fundamental value
or because they are “noise traders” and trade for reasons outside of the model.
The simplest possible Glosten-Milgrom trading model that allows herding or contrarian-
ism is one with at least three states. For this case, we show that (i) a U-shaped (Hill-shaped)
signal is necessary for herding (contrarianism) and (ii) herding (contrarianism) occurs with
positive probability if there exists at least one U-shaped (Hill-shaped) signal and there is
a suﬃcient amount of noise trading. The latter assumption on the minimum level of noise
trading is not required in all cases and is made as otherwise the bid and ask spread may
be too large to induce appropriate trading. In Section 9 we show that the intuition for our
three states characterization carries over to a setup with an arbitrary number of states.
We obtain our characterization results without restrictions on the signal structure. In
the literature on asymmetric information, it is often assumed that information structures
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Such information structures are
“well-behaved” because, for example, investors’ expectations are ordered. It may appear
that such a strong monotonicity requirement would prohibit herding or contrarianism. Yet
MLRP does not only admit the possibility of U-shaped signals (and thus herding) or Hill-
shaped signals (and thus contrarianism), but also the trading histories that generate herding
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Our second set of results concerns the impact of social learning on prices. We ﬁrst
show that the range of price movements can be very large during both contrarianism and
herding. We then compare price movements in our set-up where agents observe one another
with those in a hypothetical economy, that is otherwise identical to our set-up except that
the informed traders do not switch behaviour. We refer to the former as the transparent
economy and to the latter as the opaque economy. In contrast to the transparent economy,
in the opaque economy there is no social learning by assumption. We show, for the case
of MLRP, that once herding or contrarianism begins, prices respond more to individual
trades relative to the situation without social learning so that price rises and price drops
are greater in the transparent set-up than in the opaque one.4 As a corollary, liquidity,
measured by the inverse of the bid-ask-spread, is lower with social learning than without.
The price volatility and liquidity results may have important implications for the dis-
cussion on the merits of “market transparency.” The price path in the opaque economy
can be interpreted as the outcome of a trading mechanism in which people submit orders
without knowing the behaviour of others or the market price. Our results indicate that in
the less transparent setup, price movements are less pronounced and liquidity is higher.
While the results on price ranges, volatility and liquidity indicate similarities between
herding and contrarianism, there is also a stark diﬀerence. Contrarian trades are self-
defeating because a large number of such trades will cause prices to move “against the
crowd” thus ending contrarianism. During herding, on the other hand, investors continue
to herd when trades are “in the direction of the crowd,” so herding is self-enforcing.
Examples of situations that generate U- and Hill-shaped signals. First, a U-
shaped signal may be interpreted as a “volatility signal.”5 Very informally, an example
is a signal that generates a mean preserving spread of a symmetric prior distribution.
Conversely, a mean preserving signal that decreases the variance is Hill-shaped.
Second, U-shaped and Hill-shaped signals may also be good descriptions of situations
with a potential upcoming event that has an uncertain impact. For example, consider
the case of a company or institution that contemplates appointing a new leader who is an
uncompromising “reformer”. If this person takes power, then either the necessary reforms
take place or there will be strife with calamitous outcomes. Thus the institution will not be
the same as the new leader will be either very good or disastrous. Any private information
signifying that the person is likely to be appointed exempliﬁes a U-shaped signal and any
information revealing that this person is unlikely to be appointed (and thus the institution
4The increase in price-volatility associated with herding is only relative to a hypothetical scenario. Even
when herding is possible, in the long-run volatility settles down and prices react less to individual trades. It
is well known that the variance of Martingale price-processes such as ours is bounded by model primitives.
5We thank both Markus Brunnermeier and an anonymous referee for this interpretation.
3will carry on as before) represents a Hill-shaped signal.6
Third, consider a ﬁnancial institution FI that is a competitor to a bank that has recently
failed. Suppose there are three possible scenarios: (i) FI will also fail because it has deals
with the failed bank that will not be honored and/or that the business model of FI is as
bad as that of the failed bank; (ii) FI’s situation is entirely unrelated to the bank and the
latter’s collapse will not aﬀect FI; and (iii) FI may beneﬁt greatly from the bank’s collapse
as it is able to attract the failed bank’s customers and most capable employees. Cases (i)
and (iii) resemble extreme outcomes and case (ii) a middle outcome.
In this environment, some investor’s information might have implied that the most likely
outcome is either that FI will also go down as well or that it will beneﬁt greatly from the
failed banks’ demise. Such information is an example of a U-shaped signal. Alternatively,
some investors’ assessments might have implied that the most likely outcome is that FI is
unaﬀected. Such information is an example of a Hill-shaped signal.
It is conceivable that in the Fall of 2008 (after the collapse of Lehman) and early 2009
many investors believed that for individual ﬁnancial institutions the two extreme states
(collapse or thrive) were the most likely outcomes. Then our theory predicts the potential
for herd behaviour, with investors changing behaviour in the direction of the crowd, caus-
ing strong short-term price ﬂuctuations. Hill-shaped private signals, signifying that the
institutions were likely to be unaﬀected, may also have occurred, inducing contrarianism
and changes of behaviour against the crowd.
The mechanism that induces herding and contrarianism. Consider the above
banking example and assume that all scenarios are equally likely. Let the value of the stock
of FI in each of the three scenarios (i), (ii) and (iii) be V1 < V2 < V3, respectively. We
are interested in the behaviour of an investor, who has a private signal S, after diﬀerent
public announcements. Speciﬁcally, consider a good public announcement G that rules out
the worst state, Pr(V1|G) = 0, and a bad public announcement B that rules out the best
state, Pr(V3|B) = 0. Assume that the price of the stock is equal to the expected value
of the asset conditional on the public information and that the investor buys (sells) if his
expectation exceeds (is less than) the price. Note that the price will be higher after G and
lower after B, compared to the ex-ante situation when all outcomes are equally likely.
Both G and B eliminate one state, so that, after each such announcement there are only
two states left. In two state models, an investor has a higher (lower) expectation than the
market if and only if his private information is more (less) favourable towards the better
state than towards the worse state. Thus, in the cases of G and B, E[V |G] ≶ E[V |S,G]
is equivalent to Pr(S|V2) ≶ Pr(S|V3) and E[V |S,B] ≶ E[V |B] is equivalent to Pr(S|V2) ≶
6Other examples are an upcoming merger or takeover with uncertain merits, the possibility of a govern-
ment stepping down, announcements of FDA drug approvals, outcomes of lawsuits etc; degenerate examples
for such signals were ﬁrst discussed in Easley and O’Hara (1992) and referred to as “event uncertainty”.
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relative to the market, that it is more (less) likely that FI will thrive than being unaﬀected.
It follows from the above that the investor buys after G and sells after B if and only if
Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2) and Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2). Such an investor, loosely, herds in the sense
that he acts like a momentum trader, buying with rising and selling with falling prices. The
private information (conditional probabilities) that is both necessary and suﬃcient for such
a behaviour has thus a U shape. Conversely, the investor sells after G and buys after B if
and only if Pr(S|V3) < Pr(S|V2) and Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2). Such an investor, loosely, trades
contrary to the general movement of prices. The private information that is both necessary
and suﬃcient to generate such a behaviour has thus a Hill shape.7
There are several points to note about this example. First, the public announcements G
and B are degenerate as they each exclude one of the extreme states. Yet the same kind
of reasoning holds if we replace G by an announcement that attaches arbitrarily small
probability to the worst outcome, V1, and if we replace B by an announcement that attaches
arbitrarily small probability to the best outcome, V3. Second, in the above illustration, G
and B are exogenous public signals. In the security model described in this paper, on
the other hand, public announcements or, more generally, public information are created
endogenously by the history of publicly observable transactions. Yet the intuition behind
our characterization results is similar to the above illustration. The analysis in the paper
involves describing public histories of trades that allow investors to almost rule out some
extreme outcome, either V1 or V3.8 Such histories are equivalent to public announcements G
and B (or, to be more precise, to perturbations of G and B), and demonstrating their
existence is crucial for demonstrating the existence of herding and contrarianism.
Overview. The next section discusses some of the related literature. Section 3 outlines
the setup. Section 4 deﬁnes herding and contrarian behaviour. Section 5 discusses the nec-
essary and suﬃcient conditions that ensure herding and contrarianism. Section 6 discusses
the special case of MLRP signals. Section 7 considers the resiliency, and fragility of herding
and contrarianism and describes the range of prices for which there may be herding and
contrarianism. Section 8 discusses the impact of social learning on prices with respect to
volatility and liquidity. Section 9 extends the result to a setting with an arbitrary number
of states. Section 10 discusses the relation of our ﬁndings to an earlier important paper on
ﬁnancial market herding. Section 11 concludes. Proofs that are not in the text are either
in the appendix or in the supplementary material.
7In our formal deﬁnition of herding and contrarianism, we benchmark behaviour against the decision that
the trader would take at the initial history, but the switching mechanism is akin to what we describe here.
8In the asset market described in the paper, every state has a positive probability at all ﬁnite trading
histories because of the existence of noise traders. Therefore, we describe public histories at which the
probabilities of extreme states are arbitrarily small, but not zero.
52 Related Literature
Extensive literature surveys on herding in ﬁnancial markets are in Brunnermeier (2001),
Chamley (2004) and Vives (2008). Our work relates to the part of the literature that fo-
cusses on short-run herding. The work closest to ours is Avery and Zemsky (1998), hence-
forth AZ, who were the ﬁrst to present an intuitively appealing example of informational
herding in ﬁnancial markets. They argue that herd behaviour with informationally eﬃ-
cient asset prices is not possible unless signals are “non-monotonic” and they attribute the
herding result in their example to “multidimensional uncertainty” (investors have a ﬁner in-
formation structure than the market). In their main example, however, prices hardly move
under herding. To generate extreme price movements (bubbles) with herding AZ expand
their example to a second level of information asymmetry that leads to an even ﬁner infor-
mation partition. Yet even with these further informational asymmetries, the likelihood of
large price movements during herding is extremely small (see Chamley (2004)).
The profession, for instance Brunnermeier (2001), Bikhchandani and Sunil (2000),
Chamley (2004), has derived three messages from AZ’s paper. First, with “uni-dimensional”
or “monotonic” signal structures, herding is impossible. Second, the information structure
needed to induce herding is very special. Third, herding does not involve violent price
movements except in the most unlikely environments.
AZ’s examples are special cases of our framework. Our paper demonstrates that the
conclusions derived from AZ’s examples should be reconsidered. First, we show that it
is U-shaped signals, and not multi-dimensionality or non-monotonicity of the information
structure, that is both necessary and suﬃcient for herding. Second, while AZ’s examples are
intuitively appealing, due to their extreme nature (with several degenerate features) it may
be argued that they are very special and therefore have limited economic relevance. Our
results show instead that herding may apply in a much more general fashion and therefore,
there may be a great deal more rational informational herding than is currently expected
in the literature. Third, we show that extreme price movements with herding are possible
under not so unlikely situations, even with MLRP signals and without “further dimensions
of uncertainty.” In Section 10 below, we discuss the above in detail by comparing and
contrasting the work and conclusions of AZ with ours.
A related literature on informational learning explains how certain facets of market or-
ganization or incentives can lead to conformism and informational cascades. In Lee (1998),
ﬁxed transaction costs temporarily keep traders out of the market. When they enter sud-
denly and en masse, the market maker absorbs their trades at a ﬁxed price, leading to large
price jumps after this “avalanche.” In Cipriani and Guarino (2008), traders have private
beneﬁts from trading in addition to the fundamental value payoﬀ. As the private and public
expectations converge, private beneﬁts gain importance to the point when they overwhelm
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Dasgupta and Prat (2008) an informational cascade is triggered by traders’ reputation con-
cerns, which eventually outweigh the possible beneﬁt from trading on information. Chari
and Kehoe (2004) also study a ﬁnancial market with eﬃcient prices; herding in their model
arises with respect to a capital investment that is made outside of the ﬁnancial market.
Our work also relates to the literature that shows how public signals can have a larger
inﬂuence on stock price ﬂuctuations than warranted by their information content. Begin-
ning with He and Wang (1995) who describe the relation between public information and
non-random trading volume patterns caused by the dynamic trading activities of long-lived
traders, this literature has identiﬁed how traders who care for future prices (as opposed
to fundamentals) rely excessively on public expectations (see also Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2006), Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006), Bacchetta and Wincoop (2008), Ozdenoren and
Yuan (2007), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2010)).
All of the above contributions highlight important aspects, facets, and mechanisms that
can trigger conformism in ﬁnancial markets. Our ﬁndings complement the literature in that
the eﬀects that we identify may be combined with many of the above studies and they may
amplify the eﬀects described there.
3 The Model
We model ﬁnancial market sequential trading in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
Security: There is a single risky asset with a value V from a set of three potential
values V = {V1,V2,V3} with V1<V2<V3. Value V is the liquidation or true value when the
game has ended and all uncertainty has been resolved. States V1 and V3 are the extreme
states, state V2 is the moderate state. The prior distribution over V is denoted by Pr( ).
To simplify the computations we assume that {V1,V2,V3} = {0,V,2V}, V > 0 and that the
prior distribution is symmetric around V2; thus Pr(V1) = Pr(V3).9
Traders: There is a pool of traders consisting of two kinds of agents: Noise Traders
and Informed Traders. At each discrete date t one trader arrives at the market in an
exogenous and random sequence. Each trader can only trade once at the point in time at
which he arrives. We assume that at each date the entering trader is an informed agent
with probability   > 0 and a noise trader with probability 1 −   > 0.
The informed agents are risk neutral and rational. Each receives a private, condition-
ally i.i.d. signal about the true value of the asset V. The set of possible signals or types of in-
formed agents is denoted by S and consists of three elements S1,S2 and S3. The signal struc-
ture of the informed can therefore be described by a 3-by-3 matrix I = {Pr(Si|Vj)}i,j=1,2,3
where Pr(Si|Vj) is the probability of signal Si if the true value of the asset is Vj.
9The ideas of this paper remain valid without these symmetry assumptions.
7Noise traders have no information and trade randomly. These traders are not necessarily
irrational, but they trade for reasons not included in this model, such as liquidity.10
Market Maker: Trade in the market is organised by a market maker who has no
private information. He is subject to competition and thus makes zero-expected proﬁts.
In every period t, prior to the arrival of a trader, he posts a bid-price bid
t at which he is
willing to buy the security and an ask-price ask
t at which he is willing to sell the security.
Consequently he sets prices in the interval [V1,V3].
Traders’ Actions: Each trader can buy or sell one unit of the security at prices
posted by the market maker, or he can be inactive. So the set of possible actions for any
trader is {buy,hold,sell}. We denote the action taken in period t by the trader that arrives
at that date by at. We assume that noise traders trade with equal probability. Therefore,
in any period, a noise-trader buy, hold or sale occurs with probability γ = (1 −  )/3 each.
Public History: The structure of the model is common knowledge among all market
participants. The identity of a trader and his signal are private information, but everyone
can observe past trades and transaction prices. The history (public information) at any
date t > 1, the sequence of the traders’ past actions together with the realised past trans-
action prices, is denoted by Ht = ((a1,p1),...,(at−1,pt−1)) for t > 1, where aτ and pτ are
traders’ actions and realised transaction prices at any date τ < t respectively. Also, H1
refers to the initial history before any trade takes place.
Public Belief and Public Expectation: For any date t and any history Ht, denote
the public belief/probability that the true liquidation value of the asset is Vi by qt
i =
Pr(Vi|Ht), for each i = 1,2,3. The public expectation, which we sometimes also refer to




Also, we shall respectively denote the probability of a buy and the probability of a sale
at any history Ht, when the true value of the asset is Vi, by βt
i = Pr(buy|Ht,Vi) and
σt
i = Pr(sell|Ht,Vi). For instance, suppose that at history Ht the only informed type
that buys is Sj. Then when the true value is Vi, the probability of a buy is given by
the probability that there is a noise trader who buys plus the probability that there is an
informed trader with signal Sj: βt
i = (1 −  )/3 +  Pr(Sj|Vi).
The Informed Trader’s Optimal Choice: The game played by the informed agents
is one of incomplete information; therefore the optimal strategies correspond to a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. Here, the equilibrium strategy for each trader simply involves com-
paring the quoted prices with his expected value taking into account both the public history
and his own private information. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to equilibria in which
each agent trades only if he is strictly better oﬀ (in the case of indiﬀerence the agents do
10As is common in the microstructure literature with asymmetric information, we assume that noise
traders have positive weight (  < 1) to prevent “no-trade” outcomes a la Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
8not trade). Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of an informed trader that enters the mar-
ket in period t, receives signal St and observes history Ht is (i) to buy if E[V |Ht,St] > ask
t,
(ii) to sell if bid
t > E[V |Ht,St], and (iii) to hold in all other cases.
The Market Maker’s Price-Setting: To ensure that the market maker receives zero
expected proﬁts, the bid and ask prices must satisfy the following at any date t and any
history Ht: ask
t = E[V |at = buy at ask
t,Ht] and bid
t = E[V |at = sell at bid
t,Ht]. Thus
if there is a trade at Ht, the public expectation E[V |Ht+1] coincides with the transaction
price at time t (ask
t for a buy, bid
t for a sale).
If the market maker always sets prices equal to the public expectation, E[V |Ht], he
makes an expected loss on trades with an informed agent. However, if the market maker
sets an ask-price and a bid-price respectively above and below the public expectation, he
gains on noise traders, as their trades have no information value. Thus, in equilibrium the
market maker must make a proﬁt on trades with noise traders to compensate for any losses
against informed types. This implies that if at any history Ht, there is a possibility that
the market maker trades with an informed trader, then there is a spread between the bid
and ask prices at Ht and the public expectation E[V |Ht], satisﬁes ask
t > E[V |Ht] > bid
t.
Trading by the Informed Types and No Cascade Condition: At any history Ht
either informed types do not trade and every trade is by a noise trader or there is an
informed type that would trade at the quoted prices. The game played by the informed
types in the former case is trivial as there will be no trade by the informed from Ht
onwards and an informational cascade occurs. The reason is that if there were no trades
by the informed at Ht, no information will be revealed and the expectations and prices
remain unchanged; hence, by induction, we would have no trading by the informed and no
information revelation at any date after Ht. In this paper, we thus consider only the case
in which at every history there is an informed type that would trade at the quoted prices.
Informative Private Signals: The private signals of the informed traders are infor-
mative at history Ht if
there exists S ∈ S such that E[V |H
t,S]  = E[V |H
t]. (1)
First note that (1) implies that at Ht there is an informed type that buys and an informed
type that sells. To see this observe that by (1) there must exist two signals S′ and S′′ such
that E[V |Ht,S′] < E[V |Ht] < E[V |Ht,S′′]. If no informed type buys at Ht then there is
no informational content in a buy and ask
t = E[V |Ht]. Then, by E[V |Ht] < E[V |Ht,S′′],
type S′′ must be buying at Ht; a contradiction. Similarly, if no informed type sells at Ht
then bid
t = E[V |Ht]. Then, by E[V |Ht] > E[V |Ht,S′], type S′ must be selling at Ht; a
contradiction. Second, it is also the case that if there is an informed type who trades at Ht,
then (1) must hold. Otherwise, for every signal S ∈ S, E[V |Ht,S] = E[V |Ht] = ask
t = bid
t
and the informed types would not trade at Ht.
9It follows from the above that (1) is both necessary and suﬃcient for trading by an
informed type at Ht. Since we are interested in the case when the informed types trade,
we therefore assume throughout this paper that (1) holds at every history Ht.11
One important consequence of condition (1) is that past behaviour can be inferred from
past transaction prices alone: since the bid and ask prices always diﬀer by condition (1),
one can infer behaviour iteratively, starting from date 1. Therefore, all the results of this
paper are valid if traders observe only past transaction prices and no-trades.
Long-run behaviour of the model. Since price formation in our model is stan-
dard, (1) also ensures that standard asymptotic results on eﬃcient prices hold. More
speciﬁcally, by standard arguments as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) we have that trans-
action prices form a martingale process. Since by (1) buys and sales have some information
content (at every date there is an informed type that buys and one that sells), it also follows
that beliefs and prices converge to the truth in the long-run (see, for instance, Proposition 4
in AZ). However, here we are solely interested in short-run behaviour and ﬂuctuations.
Conditional signal distributions. As we outlined in the introduction, the possibility
of herding or a contrarian behaviour for any informed agent with signal S ∈ S depends
critically on the shape of the conditional signal distribution of S. Henceforth, we refer
to the conditional signal distribution of the signal as the csd. Furthermore, we will also
employ the following terminology to describe four diﬀerent types of csds:
increasing: Pr(S|V1) ≤ Pr(S|V2) ≤ Pr(S|V3); decreasing: Pr(S|V1) ≥ Pr(S|V2) ≥ Pr(S|V3);
U-shaped: Pr(S|Vi) > Pr(S|V2) for i = 1,3; Hill-shaped: Pr(S|Vi) < Pr(S|V2) for i = 1,3.
An increasing csd is strictly increasing if all three conditional probabilities for the signal
are distinct; a strictly decreasing csd is similarly deﬁned.
For the results in our paper it is also important whether the likelihood of a signal is
higher in one of the extreme states V1 or V3 relative to the other extreme state. We thus
deﬁne the bias of a signal S as Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V1). A U-shaped csd with a negative bias,
Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V1) < 0, will be labeled as an nU-shaped csd and a U-shaped csd with a
positive bias, Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V1) > 0, will be labeled as a pU-shaped csd. Similarly, we
use nHill (pHill) to describe a Hill-shaped csd with a negative (positive) bias.
In describing the above properties of a type of csd for a signal we shall henceforth drop
the reference to the csd and attribute the property to the signal itself, when the meaning
is clear. Similarly, when describing the behaviour of a signal recipient we attribute the
behaviour to the signal itself.
11A suﬃcient condition for (1) to hold at every Ht is that all minors of order two of matrix I are non-zero.
104 Deﬁnitions of Herding and Contrarian Behaviour
In the literature, there are several deﬁnitions of herding. Some require “action convergence”
or even complete informational cascades where all types take the same action in each state,
irrespective of their private information; see Brunnermeier (2001), Chamley (2004), Vives
(2008). The key feature of this early literature was that herding can induce, after some
date, the loss of all private information and wrong or ineﬃcient decisions henceforth.
A situation like an informational cascade in which all informed types act alike may
not, however, be very interesting in an informationally eﬃcient ﬁnancial market setting. In
such a framework prices account for the information contained in the traders’ actions. If
all informed types act alike then their actions would be uninformative, and as result, prices
would not move. Therefore, such uniformity of behaviour cannot explain prices movements,
which is a key feature of ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, if the uniform action involves trading,
then a large imbalance of trades would accumulate without aﬀecting prices — contrary to
common empirical ﬁndings.12
Furthermore, as we have explained in the previous section, in our “standard” microstruc-
ture trading model, at any history uniform behaviour by the informed types is possible if
and only if all private signals are uninformative, in the sense that the private expectations
of all informed types are equal that of the market expectation (condition (1) is violated).
The case of such uninformative private signals is trivial and uninteresting as it implies that
no further information is revealed, that all informed types have the same expectation and
that, because we assume that informed agents trade only if trading makes them strictly
better oﬀ, a no-trade cascade results.
In this paper we thus focus on the social learning (learning from others) aspect of
behaviour for individual traders that is implied by the notion of herding from the earlier
literature. Speciﬁcally, we follow Brunnermeier (2001)’s (Ch. 5) description of herding as
a situation in which “an agent imitates the decision of his predecessor even though his
own signal might advise him to take a diﬀerent action” and we consider the behaviour of
a particular signal type by looking at how the history of past trading can induce a trader
to change behaviour and trade against his private signal.13
Imitative behaviour is not the only type of behaviour that learning from others’ past
trading activities may generate: a trader may also switch behaviour and go against what
most have done in the past. We call such social learning contrarianism and diﬀerentiate it
from herding by describing the latter as a history-induced switch of opinion in the direction
of the crowd and the former as a history-induced switch against the direction of the crowd.
12See, for instance, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002).
13Vives (2008) (Ch. 6) adopts a similar view of herding, deﬁning it as a situation in which agents put
“too little” weight on their private signals with respect to a well-deﬁned welfare benchmark.
11The direction of the crowd here is deﬁned by the “recent” price movement. Thus, there is
a symmetry in our deﬁnitions, making herding the intuitive counterpart to contrarianism.
Deﬁnition Herding. A trader with signal S buy herds in period t at history Ht if and
only if (i) E[V |S] < bid
1, (ii) E[V |S,Ht] > ask
t, (iii-h) E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. Sell herding at
history Ht is deﬁned analogously with the required conditions E[V |S] > ask
1, E[V |S,Ht] <
bid
t, and E[V |Ht] < E[V ]. Type S herds if he either buy herds or sell herds at some history.
Contrarianism. A trader with signal S engages in buy contrarianism in period t at
history Ht if and only if (i) E[V |S] < bid
1, (ii) E[V |S,Ht] > ask
t, (iii-c) E[V |Ht] <
E[V ]. Sell contrarianism at history Ht is deﬁned analogously with the required conditions
E[V |S] > ask
1, E[V |S,Ht] < bid
t, and E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. Type S engages in contrarianism if
he engages either in buy contrarianism or sell contrarianism at some history.
Both with buy herding and buy contrarianism, type S prefers to sell at the initial history,
before observing other traders’ actions (condition (i)), but prefers to buy after observing the
history Ht (condition (ii)). The key diﬀerences between buy herding and buy contrarianism
are conditions (iii-h) and (iii-c). The former requires the public expectation, which is the
last transaction price and an average of the bid and ask prices, to rise at history Ht so that
a change of action from selling to buying at Ht is with the general movement of the prices
(crowd), whereas the latter condition requires the public expectation to have dropped so
that a trader who buys at Ht acts against the movement of prices.
Henceforth, we refer to a “buy herding history” as one at which some type, were they
to trade, would buy herd at that history; similarly for a “buy contrarianism history.”
Our deﬁnition of herding is identical to that in Avery and Zemsky (1998),14 and it has
also been used in other work on social learning in ﬁnancial markets (see, for instance, Cipri-
ani and Guarino (2005) or Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005)). It describes histories
at which a trader acts “against his signal” (judgement) and follows “the trend”, where
“against his signal” is deﬁned by comparing the herding action to the benchmark without
public information. “The trend” is identiﬁed by price movements based on the idea that
prices rise (fall) when there are more (less) buys than sales. The contrarianism deﬁnition,
on the other hand, captures the contra-trend action that is also against one’s signal.15
Our deﬁnitions also capture well-documented ﬁnancial market trading behaviour. In
particular, our herding deﬁnition is a formalization of the idea of rational momentum trad-
14Avery and Zemsky (1998)’s deﬁnition of contrarianism is stronger than ours (they also impose an
additional bound on price movements that reﬂects the expectations that would obtain if the traders receives
an inﬁnite number of draws of the same signal). We adopt the deﬁnition of contrarianism above because,
as we explained before, it is a natural and simple counterpart to the deﬁnition of herd behaviour.
15Herding and contrarianism here refer to extreme switches of behaviour from selling to buying or the
reverse. One could expand the deﬁnition to switches from holding to buying or to selling (or the reverse).
For consistency with the earlier literature, we use the extreme cases where switches do not include holding.
12ing. It also captures the situation in which traders behave as if their demand functions
are increasing. Contrarianism has a mean-reversion ﬂavour. Both momentum and con-
trarian trading have been analyzed extensively in the empirical literature and have been
found to generate abnormal returns over some time horizon.16 Our analysis thus provides
a characterization for momentum and mean reversion behaviour and shows that it can
be rational.
As we have argued above, in our set-up we assume that trades are informative to avoid
the uninteresting case of a no-trade cascade. Thus, we cannot have a situation in which
all informed types act alike.17 Nevertheless, our set-up allows for the possibility that a
very large portion of informed traders is involved in herding or contrarianism. The precise
proportion of such informed traders is, in fact, determined exogenously by the information
structure through the likelihood that a trader receives the relevant signal. We discuss this
point further in Section 11 and show that this proportion can be arbitrarily large.
Although the informative trade assumption ensures that asymptotically the true value
of the security is learned, our deﬁnition of herding and contrarianism admits the possibility
of switches of trades “in the wrong direction” in the short run. For instance, traders may
buy herd even though the true value of the asset is V1 (the lowest).
Finally, social learning can have eﬃciency consequences. In any setting where agents
learn from the actions of others, an informational externality is inevitable as future agents
are aﬀected when earlier agents take actions that reveal private information. For example,
in the early herding models of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee
(1992) once a cascade begins, no further information is revealed. However, in this paper
we do not address the eﬃciency element, because it requires a welfare benchmark, which
“is generally lacking in asymmetric information models of asset markets” (see Avery and
Zemsky (1998), p. 728). Instead, our deﬁnition is concerned with observable behaviour and
outcomes that are sensitive to the details of the trading history. Such sensitivities may
dramatically aﬀect prices in ﬁnancial markets.
16In the empirical literature, contrarian behaviour is found to be proﬁtable in the very short run (1
week and 1 month, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990)) and in the very long run (3-5 years, de Bondt
and Thaler (1985))). Momentum trading is found to be proﬁtable over the medium term (3-12 months,
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) and exceptionally unproﬁtable beyond that (the 24 months following the ﬁrst
12, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)). Sadka (2006) studies systematic liquidity risk and links a component
of it, which is caused by informed trading, to returns on momentum trading.
17Note that even though with no cascades (the market expects that) the diﬀerent types do not take the
same actions, in degenerate settings when a particular type is not present in certain states, it is possible
that in these particular states all informed types that occur with positive probability take the same action.
An example of such a degenerate situation is the information structure in Avery and Zemsky (1998) that
we discuss in Section 10.
135 Characterization Results: The General Case
The main characterization result for herding and contrarianism is as follows:
Theorem 1 (a) Herding. (i) Necessity: If type S herds, then S is U-shaped with a non-
zero bias. (ii) Suﬃciency: If there is a U-shaped type with a non-zero bias, there exists
 h ∈ (0,1] such that some informed type herds when   <  h.
(b) Contrarianism. (i) Necessity: If type S acts as a contrarian, then S is Hill-shaped
with a non-zero bias. (ii) Suﬃciency: If there is a Hill-shaped type with a non-zero bias,
there exists  c ∈ (0,1] such that some informed type acts as a contrarian when   <  c.
Theorem 1 does not specify when we have buy or sell herding or when we have buy
or sell contrarianism. In what follows, we ﬁrst consider the necessary and then the suﬃ-
cient conditions for each of these cases. The proof of Theorem 1 then follows from these
characterization results at the end of this section.
We begin by stating three useful lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma provides a useful character-
ization for the diﬀerence between private and public expectations.














Second, as the prior on the liquidation values is symmetric, it follows that the expec-
tation of the informed is less (greater) than the public expectation at the initial history if
and only if his signal is negatively (positively) biased.
Lemma 2 For any signal S, E[V |S] is less than E[V ] if and only if S has a negative bias,
and E[V |S] is greater than E[V ] if and only if S has a positive bias.
An immediate implication of this lemma is that someone sells at the initial history only if
this type’s signal is negatively biased and buys only if the signal is positively biased.
Third, note that herding and contrarianism involve switches in behaviour after changes
in public expectations relative to the initial period. A useful way to characterize these
changes is the following.
Lemma 3 If E[V |Ht] > E[V ] then qt
3 > qt
1 and if E[V ] > E[V |Ht] then qt
1 > qt
3.
Thus the public expectation rises (falls) if and only if the public belief attaches a lower
(higher) probability to the lowest value, V1, than to the highest value, V3.
5.1 Necessary Conditions
Herding and contrarianism by a given signal type involve buying at some history and selling
at another. Our ﬁrst result establishes that this cannot happen if the signal is decreasing
or increasing. Consider a decreasing type S. Since the ask price always exceeds the public
14expectation, it follows that, at any Ht, type S does not buy if the expectation of S,
E[V |S,Ht], is no more than the public expectation, E[V |Ht]. The latter must indeed hold
because, for any two valuations Vℓ, Vh such that Vℓ < Vh, the likelihood that a decreasing






Pr(Vh|Ht). Formally, every term in (2) is non-positive when S
is decreasing; therefore, it follows immediately from Lemma 1 that E[V |S,Ht] ≤ E[V |Ht].
An analogous set of arguments demonstrates that an increasing type does not sell at
any history. Therefore, we can state the following.
Proposition 1 If S is decreasing then type S does not buy at any history. If S is increasing
then type S does not sell at any history. Thus recipients of such signals cannot herd or
behave as contrarians.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that any herding and contrarianism type must be either U or
Hill-shaped. We next reﬁne these necessary conditions further and state the main result of
this subsection as follows.
Proposition 2 (a) Type S buy herds only if S is nU-shaped and sell herds only if S is
pU-shaped. (b) Type S acts as a buy contrarian only if S is nHill-shaped and acts as a sell
contrarian only if S is pHill-shaped.
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 2 for buy herding and buy contrarianism is as follows.
Suppose that S buy herds or acts as a buy contrarian. Then it must be that at H1 type S
sells and thus his expectation is below the public expectation. By Lemma 2, this implies
that S is negatively biased.18 Thus, by Proposition 1, S is either nU or nHill-shaped.
The proof is completed by showing that buy herding is inconsistent with an nHill-shaped
csd and that buy contrarianism is inconsistent with an nU-shaped csd. To see the intuition,
for example, for the case of buy herding, note that in forming his belief a trader with an
nHill-shaped csd puts less weight on the tails of his belief (and thus more on the center)
relative to the public belief; furthermore, the shift from the tails towards the center is more
for value V3 than for V1 because of the negative bias. When buy herding occurs, the public
belief must have risen and thus, by Lemma 3, the public belief attaches more weight to V3
relative to V1 (i.e. qt
1 < qt
3). Such a redistribution of probability mass ensures that S’s
expectation is less than that of the public. Hence an nHill-shaped S cannot be buying.
The arguments for sell herding and sell contrarianism are analogous except that here
the bias has to be positive to ensure that the informed type buys at the initial history.
5.2 Suﬃcient Conditions
The above necessary conditions — U shape for herding and Hill shape for contrarianism
— turn out to be almost suﬃcient as well. Before stating the suﬃciency results, it will be
18The bias is only required because we assume that priors are symmetric.
15useful to discuss two of the ideas that provide insight into the analysis.
(I) With a U-shaped signal S, the diﬀerence between the private and the public expecta-
tion, E[V |S,Ht]−E[V |Ht], is positive at histories at which the public probability of state V1





close to zero) and is negative at histories at which the public probability of state V3 is suf-





to zero). For a Hill-shaped signal S the sign of this diﬀerence is the reverse.
The intuition for this statement relates to the example from the introduction. Consider




3 are close to zero. Then there are
eﬀectively two states V2 and V3 at Ht. This means that at such a history the diﬀerence
between the expectations of an informed type S and of the public (which has no private
information), E[V |S,Ht]−E[V |Ht], has the same sign as Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V2).19 The latter
is positive for a U-shaped S and negative for a Hill-shaped S. Thus, at such history,
E[V |S,Ht] − E[V |Ht] is positive if S is U-shaped and is negative if S is Hill-shaped.





2 are close to zero. At such a history there are eﬀectively two states, V1 and V2;
therefore, E[V |S,Ht]−E[V |Ht] has the same sign as Pr(S|V2)−Pr(S|V1).20 Since the latter
is negative for a U-shaped S and positive for a Hill-shaped S, it follows that at such a
history E[V |S,Ht]−E[V |Ht] is negative if S is U-shaped and is positive if S is Hill-shaped.
(II) The probability of noise trading may have to be suﬃciently large to ensure that the
bid-ask spread is not too wide both at the initial initial history and later at the history at
which the herding or contrarian candidate changes behaviour.
In (I) we have compared the private expectation of the informed trader with that of the
public. To establish the existence of herding or contrarian behaviour, however, we must
compare the private expectations with the bid- and ask-prices. The diﬀerence is that bid-
and ask-prices form a spread around the public expectation. To ensure the possibility of
herding or contrarianism, this spread must be suﬃciently “tight”. Tightness of the spread,
in turn, depends on the extent of noise trading: the more noise there is (the smaller the
likelihood of the informed types,  ), the tighter the spread.
More speciﬁcally, to ensure buy herding or buy contrarianism (the other cases are
similar) by an informed type, a minimal amount of noise trading may be necessary, so
that the informed type (i) sells initially and (ii) switches to buying after some history Ht.
Below, we formalize these minimal noise trading restrictions by introducing two bounds,




3 are close to zero, the ﬁrst and the third terms in (2)
are arbitrarily small; moreover, the second term in (2) has the same sign as Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V2); therefore,
it follows from from Lemma 1 that E[V |S,Ht] − E[V |Ht] has the same sign as Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V2).
20This claim also follows from Lemma 1: at such history, the second and the third terms in (2) are
arbitrarily small and the second term in (2) has the same sign as Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V2).
16one to ensure a tight spread for the initial sell and the second to ensure a tight spread for
the subsequent switch to buying, and require the likelihood of informed trading   to be
less than both these bounds.
Appealing to the above ideas, we can now state a critical lemma. To save space we
state the result only for the case of buy herding and buy contrarianism.
Lemma 4 (i) Suppose that signal S is nU-shaped. Then there exist  i and  s
bh ∈ (0,1]
such that S buy herds if   <  bh ≡ min{ i, s
bh} and if the following holds:
For any ǫ > 0 there exists a history H




l < ǫ for all l = 2,3. (3)
(ii) Suppose signal S is nHill-shaped. Then there exist  i and  s
bc ∈ (0,1] such that S acts
as a buy contrarian if   <  bc ≡ min{ i, s
bc} and if the following holds:
For any ǫ > 0 there exists a history H




l < ǫ for all l = 1,2. (4)
Conditions (3) and (4) above ensure that there are histories at which the probability
of an extreme state, V1 or V3, can be made arbitrarily small relative to the other states.
Value  bh is the minimum of the two bounds  i and  s
bh, mentioned in (II), that respectively
ensure that spreads are small enough at the initial history and at the time of the switch
of behaviour by a buy herding type. Similarly,  bc is the minimum of the two bounds  i
and  s
bc that respectively ensure that spreads are small enough at the initial history and at
the time of the switch of behaviour by a buy contrarian type S. Below we will discuss how
restrictive these bounds are, and if they are necessary for the results.
A sketch of the proof for part (i) of Lemma 4 is as follows. First, by Lemma 2, S having
a negative bias implies that E[V |S] < E[V ]. Then it follows from the arguments outlined in
(II) above that one can ﬁnd an upper bound  i > 0 on the size of the informed trading such
that if   <  i then at H1 the bid price bid
1 is close enough to the public expectation E[V ]
so that E[V |S] is also below bid
1, i.e. S sells at H1.
Second, since S is U-shaped, it follows from the arguments outlined in (I) that at




3 are suﬃciently small E[V |S,Ht] > E[V |Ht] (by
condition (3) such history Ht exists). Then, by the arguments outlined in (II) above, one
can ﬁnd an upper bound  s
bh > 0 such that if   <  s
bh then at Ht the ask price ask
t is
suﬃciently close to E[V |Ht] so that E[V |S,Ht] also exceeds ask
t, i.e. S switches to buying.
Finally, since qt
1/qt
3 is small at Ht, by Lemma 3, E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. Thus, the switch to
buying at Ht by S is in the direction of the crowd.
The argument for contrarianism in part (ii) is analogous except that to ensure E[V |S,Ht]





2 are suﬃciently small (condition (4) ensures that such history Ht exists). Then
by (II) there exists  s
bc > 0 such that if   <  s
bc, ask
t is suﬃciently close to E[V |Ht] so that
E[V |S,Ht] > ask
t. Furthermore, at such a history Ht, S will be buying against the crowd
because when qt
3/qt
1 is small, which is the case at Ht, by Lemma 3, E[V |Ht] < E[V ].
17A similar set of results to Lemma 4 can be obtained for the cases of sell herding and sell
contrarianism except that to ensure sell herding the appropriate assumptions are that S
is pU and (4) holds, and to ensure sell contrarian we need that S is pHill and (3) holds.21
The suﬃciency results in Lemma 4 are non-vacuous provided that conditions (3) and (4)
are satisﬁed. As these conditions depict properties of endogenous variables, to complete the
analysis we need to show the existence of the histories assumed by conditions (3) and (4).
In some cases, this is a straightforward task. The easiest case arises when at any t there









of time). For example, suppose that the probability of a buy is uniformly increasing in the
liquidation value at any date and history:













j) when there is a buy at date t, it follows that in this case a




3 uniformly. Thus if (5) holds, a suﬃciently large number of









Thus, if the probability of a sale is uniformly decreasing in the liquidation value at any Ht,




j + ǫ for any j > i and any t, (6)




2 uniformly. Thus, if (6) holds, a suﬃciently large
number of sales induces the histories described in (4).22
Demonstrating conditions (3) and (4) generally, however, requires a substantially more









2 decreasing at every t.23 For
these cases, we construct outcome paths consisting of two diﬀerent stages. For example,
to ensure (3), the path is constructed so that in the ﬁrst stage qt
1/qt
2 becomes small while
ensuring that qt
1/qt
3 does not increase by too much. Then in the second stage, once qt
1/qt
2 is
suﬃciently small, the continuation path makes qt
1/qt
3 small while ensuring that qt
1/qt
2 does
not increase by too much. A similar construction is used for (4).
Such constructions work for most signal distributions. The exceptions are cases with
two U-shaped signals with opposite biases or two Hill-shaped signals with opposite biases.
In these cases we can show, depending on the bias of the third signal, that either (3) or (4)
21These diﬀerences arise because with sell herding or sell contrarianism the informed needs to buy initially
and switch to selling later. To ensure the former, by Lemma 2, we need to assume a positive bias and, to
ensure the latter, the appropriate “extreme” histories at which the switches happen are the opposite of the
buy herding and buy contrarian case. Also, the values for the bounds on the size of informed trading might
be diﬀerent for sell herding and sell contrarianism from those for buy herding and buy contrarianism.
22These monotonicity properties of the probability of a buy and the probability of a sale as deﬁned in (5)
and (6) are satisﬁed, for instance, by MLRP information structures; see the next section.
23For instance, if for every action at (=buy, sell or hold) the probability of at in state V1 is no less than





18holds, but we cannot show both. For example, if one of the three signals is nU and another
is pU, then we can show that (3) holds if the third signal has a non-negative bias, and (4)
holds if the third signal has a non-positive bias. This implies, by Lemma 4 (i), that in the
former case the nU type buy herds, and in the latter case, by an analogous argument, the
pU type sell herds (similarly for the contrarian situation).
The next proposition is our main suﬃciency result. It follows from the discussion above,
concerning (3) and (4), and Lemma 4 (for completeness, we state the result for buy and
sell herding and for buy and sell contrarianism).
Proposition 3 (a) Let S be nU-shaped. If another signal is pU-shaped, assume the third
signal has a non negative bias. Then there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S buy herds if  < bh.
(b) Let S be pU-shaped. If another signal is nU-shaped, assume the third signal has a non
positive bias. Then there exists  sh ∈ (0,1] such that S sell herds if   <  sh.
(c) Let S be nHill-shaped. If another signal is pHill-shaped assume the third signal has a
non positive bias. Then there exists  bc ∈ (0,1] such that S is a buy contrarian if   <  bc.
(d) Let S be pHill-shaped. If another signal is nHill-shaped, assume the third signal has a
non negative bias. Then there exists  sc ∈ (0,1] such that S is a sell contrarian if   <  sc.
Discussion of the Noise Restriction. For each of our suﬃciency results above (Lemma 4
and Proposition 3) we assume that   is less than some upper bound. We will now discuss
whether these bounds are necessary for our results, and whether they are restrictive.
Consider the case of buy herding by an nU-shaped type S as in Lemma 4 (i). For
this suﬃciency result we assume two restrictions:   <  i and   <  s
bh. These conditions
respectively ensure that the spread is small enough at the initial history and at history Ht
at which there is a switch in behaviour. In the appendix we show that there exists a unique
value for the ﬁrst bound,  i ∈ (0,1], such that   <  i is also necessary for buy herding.
In general we cannot ﬁnd a unique upper bound for the second value,  s
bh, such that   <
 s
bh is also necessary for buy herding. The reason is that the upper bound that ensures that
the spread is not too large at the history Ht at which S switches to buying may depend
on what the types other than S do at Ht. Since there may be more than one history at
which S switches to buying, this upper bound may not be unique.
The above diﬃculty with respect to the necessity of the second noise condition   <  s
bh
does not arise, for instance, when types other than S always take the same action.24 More
generally, we show in the supplementary material (Proposition 3a), that   <  s
bh is also
necessary for buy herding provided there is at most one U-shaped signal.
A similar argument applies to contrarian behaviour. The noise restriction with respect
to the initial trade is necessary, whereas the noise restriction with respect to the switch of
behaviour is necessary as long as there is at most one Hill-shaped type.
24For example, this happens when the information structure satisﬁes MLRP; see the next section.
19Finally, note that the bounds on   in our suﬃciency results do not always constitute a
restriction. Consider again the case of buy herding for an nU type S. If at H1, type S has
the lowest expectation among all informed types, then his expectation must be less than
the bid price at H1, and thus, there is no need for any restriction on the size of the informed
at H1 ( i can be set to 1). Likewise, if at Ht at which buy herding occurs type S has the
highest expectation (for example, this happens if no type other than S buys at Ht), then
his expectation must be greater than the ask price at Ht and therefore, no restriction on the
size of the informed is needed ( s
bh can be set to 1). Consequently, to obtain our suﬃciency
results there are restrictions on the value of   only if at H1 or at the switch history Ht the
expectation of the herding candidate is in between those of the other signal types.25
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity part in Theorem 1 follows immediately from Proposition 2. The proof of the
suﬃciency part for case (a) of herding is as follows. Let  h = min{ sh, bh}, where  bh
and  sh are the bounds for herding given in Proposition 3. Also, assume that   <  h
and that there exist a U-shaped signal as in part (a) of Theorem 1. Then there are two
possibilities: either there is another U-shaped signal with the opposite bias or there is not.
If there is no other U-shaped signal with the opposite bias, then by part (a) of Proposition 3,
the U-shaped type buy herds if it has a negative bias and by part (b) of Proposition 3 the
U-shaped type sell herds if it has a positive bias. If there is another U-shaped signal with
the opposite bias, then by parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 3, one of the U-shaped signals
must herd. This is because if the third signal is weakly positive then the U-shaped signal
with a negative bias buy herds, and if the third signal is weakly negative then the U-shaped
signal with a positive bias sell herds. The reasoning for suﬃciency in part (b) of Theorem 1
is analogous and is obtained by setting  c = min{ sc, bc}, where  sc and  bc are the bounds
for contrarianism from Proposition 3.26  
6 Social Learning with MLRP Information Structure
The literature on asymmetric information often assumes that the information structure is
monotonic in the sense that it satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
Here this means that for any signals Sl,Sh ∈ S and values Vl,Vh ∈ V such that Sl < Sh
and Vl < Vh, Pr(Sh|Vl)Pr(Sl|Vh) < Pr(Sh|Vh)Pr(Sl|Vl).
MLRP is very restrictive (it is stronger than ﬁrst order stochastic dominance) and at
ﬁrst might seem to be too strong to allow herding or contrarianism. This turns out to be
25Romano and Sabourian (2010) extend the present model to the case where traders can trade a contin-
uum of quantities. In this setting, they show that no restrictions on   are needed because at each history,
each quantity is traded by a speciﬁc signal type.
26The bounds  bh, sh, sc, bc in the proof of Proposition 3 are such that  h =  c.
20false. Not only does MLRP not exclude such possibilities, it actually enables one to derive
a sharper sets of results for the existence of herding and contrarianism. Moreover, with
MLRP the histories that can generate herding or contrarianism can be easily identiﬁed.
MLRP is a set of restrictions on the conditional probabilities for the entire signal struc-
ture and is equivalent to assuming that all minors of order two of the information matrix I
are positive. Herding or contrarianism, on the other hand, relate to the csd of a signal being
U- or Hill-shaped, i.e. to the individual row in matrix I that corresponds to the signal.
Therefore, to analyse the possibility of herding or contrarianism with MLRP, we need to
consider the csd of the diﬀerent signals under MLRP. In the next lemma we describe some
useful implications of MLRP.
Lemma 5 Assume S1 < S2 < S3 and the information structure satisﬁes MLRP. Then
(i) E[V |S1,Ht] < E[V |S2,Ht] < E[V |S3,Ht] at any t and any Ht.
(ii) In any equilibrium S1 types always sell and S3 types always buy.
(iii)S1 is strictly decreasing and S3 is strictly increasing.
(iv) The probability of a buy is uniformly increasing in the liquidation value as speciﬁed
in (5) and the probability of a sale is uniformly decreasing as speciﬁed in (6).
Part (i) states that MLRP imposes a natural order on the signals in terms of their condi-
tional expectations after any history. Part (iv) implies that with MLRP the probability of
a buy is uniformly increasing and the probability of a sell is uniformly decreasing in the
liquidation values. Parts (ii) and (iii) state that MLRP restricts the behaviour and the
shape of the lowest and the highest signals S1 and S3. In particular, these two types do
not change behaviour and they are decreasing and increasing respectively.
Lemma 5, however, does not impose any restrictions on the behaviour or the shape of
the middle signal S2. In fact, MLRP is consistent with a middle signal S2 that is decreasing,
increasing, Hill-shaped or U-shaped with a negative or a positive bias — Table 1 describes
a robust example of all these possibilities. Thus, with MLRP, S2 is the only type that can
display herding or contrarian behaviour. We can then state the following characterisation
result for MLRP information structures (again we omit the analogous sell herding and sell
contrarian cases).
Theorem 2 Assume S1 < S2 < S3 and the signal structure satisﬁes MLRP. (a) If S2 is
nU, there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S2 buy herds if and only if   <  bh. (b) If S2 is nHill,
there exists  bc∈(0,1] such that S2 acts as a buy contrarian if and only if  < bc.
Proof: Fix the critical levels  bh ≡ min{ i, s
bh} for buy herding and  bc = min{ i, s
bc} for
buy contrarianism, where  i is deﬁned in Lemma 8 and  s
bh and  s
bc are respectively deﬁned
in (12) and (13) in the appendix. The “if” part follows from Lemma 4: By Lemma 5 (iv),




3 can be made
21Pr(S|V ) V1 V2 V3
S1 δ(1 − β)/(β + δ(1 − β)) δ(1 − α) 0
S2 β/(β + δ(1 − β)) α β/(β + (1 − δ)(1 − β))
S3 0 (1 − δ)(1 − α) (1 − β)(1 − δ)/(β + (1 − δ)(1 − β))
Table 1
An Example of an MLRP Signal Distribution.
For α,δ ∈ (0,1), and β ∈ (0,α) the above satisﬁes MLRP. Moreover, S2 is nU-shaped if β ∈ (αδ/(1 −
α(1 − δ)),α) and δ < 1/2, pU-shaped if β ∈ (α(1 − δ)/(1 − αδ),α) and δ > 1/2, nHill-shaped if β ∈
(0,αδ/(1−α(1−δ))) and δ < 1/2, pHill-shaped if β ∈ (0,α(1−δ)/(1−αδ)) and δ > 1/2, decreasing if β ∈
(αδ/(1−α(1−δ)),α(1−δ)/(1−αδ)) and δ < 1/2, and increasing if β ∈ (α(1−δ)/(1−αδ),αδ/(1−α(1−δ)))
and δ > 1/2.
arbitrarily close to zero by considering histories that involve a suﬃciently large number of




2 can be made arbitrarily close to zero by considering histories
with a suﬃciently large number of sales. Then conditions (3) and (4) hold and by Lemma 4,
an nU-shaped S2 buy herds and an nHill-shaped S2 acts as a buy contrarian.
The “only if” part follows from Proposition 3a in the supplementary material.27  
The “if” part of the above proof demonstrates that with MLRP it is strikingly easy to
describe histories that induce herding by a U-shaped type or contrarianism by a Hill-shaped
type: an nU-shaped S2 buy herds after a suﬃcient number of buys and an nHill-shaped S2
acts as a buy contrarian after a suﬃcient number of sales.28
7 Resilience, Fragility and Large Price Movements
We now consider the robustness of herding and contrarianism and describe the range of
prices for which herding and contrarianism can occur. Throughout this section we assume
that signals satisfy the well-behaved case of MLRP (we will return to this later) and perform
the analysis for buy herding and buy contrarianism; the other cases are analogous.
We ﬁrst show that buy herding persists if and only if the number of sales during an
episode of buy herding is not too large. This implies in particular that buy herding be-
haviour persists if the buy herding episode consists of only buys. We also show that during
27The “only if” part of the theorem also follows from the discussion in the previous section on noise
trading: if types other than S2 always take the same action, then there is a unique upper bound on the
size of the informed trading that ensures that the spreads are suﬃciently tight for S2 to buy herd (or to
act as a buy contrarian). By Lemma 5, S3 always buys and S1 always sells. Therefore, with MLRP the
upper bound  bh is unique.
28Note that the bounds on the size of the informed  bh and  bc in Theorem 2 must be strictly below 1.
To see this, recall that by part (i) of Lemma 5, the expectation of the herding or contrarian candidate
type S2 is always between those of the other two types at every history. Also, by part (ii) of Lemma 5, S1
always sells and S3 always buys. Therefore, if   is arbitrarily close to 1 then, to ensure zero proﬁts for the
market maker, E[V |S1,Ht] < bid
t < E[V |S2,Ht] and E[V |S2,Ht] < ask
t < E[V |S3,Ht] for every Ht. This
implies that S2 does not trade; a contradiction.
22a buy herding episode as the number of buys increases, it takes more sales to break the
herd. For buy contrarianism the impact of buys and sales work in reverse: in particular,
buy contrarianism persists if and only if the number of buys during an episode of buy
contrarianism is not too large. This means that buy contrarianism does not end if the buy
contrarianism episode consists of only sales. We also show that during a buy contrarianism
episode as the number of sales increase, it takes more buys to end buy contrarianism.
Proposition 4 Assume MLRP. Consider any history Hr = (a1,...,ar−1) and suppose
that Hr is followed by b ≥ 0 buys and s ≥ 0 sales in some order; denote this history by
Ht = (a1,...,ar+b+s−1).29
(a)If there is buy herding by S at Hr then there exists an increasing function ¯ s( )>1
such that S continues to buy herd at Ht if and only if s < ¯ s(b).
(b) If there is buy contrarianism by S at Hr then there exists an increasing function
¯ b( )>1 such that S continues to act as a buy contrarian at Ht if and only if b < ¯ b(s).
One implication of the above result is that herding is resilient and contrarianism is self
defeating. The reason is that when buy herding or buy contrarianism begins, buys become
more likely relative to a situation where the herding or contrarian type does not switch.
Thus, in both buy herding and buy contrarianism there is a general bias towards buying
(relative to the case of no social learning). By Proposition 4, buy herding behaviour persists
if there are not too many sales and buy contrarian ends if there is a suﬃciently large number
of buys. Thus herding is more likely to persist whereas contrarianism is more likely to end.
To see the intuition for Proposition 4 consider the case of buy herding in part (a). At
any history the diﬀerence between the expectation of the herding type S and that of the
market is determined by the relative likelihood that they attach to each of the three states.
Since the herding type S must have an nU-shaped csd it follows that in comparing the
expectation of the herding type S with that of the market there are two eﬀects: ﬁrst, S
attaches more weight to V3 relative to V2 than the market and, second, S attaches more
weight to V1 relative to both V2 and V3 than the market. Since V1 < V2 < V3 and at any
history Hr with buy herding the expectation of the herding type S exceeds that of the





3 are suﬃciently small so that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. Also, by Lemma 5 (iv),
when MLRP holds, buys reduce the probability of V1 relative to the other states. Therefore,
further buys after Hr make the second eﬀect more insigniﬁcant and thereby ensure that
the expectation of the herding type S remains above the ask price.
On the other hand, by Lemma 5 (iv) when MLRP holds, sales reduce the probability
of V3 relative to the other states; thus sales after Hr make the ﬁrst eﬀect less signiﬁcant.
29We will henceforth omit past prices from the history Ht to simplify the exposition.
23Therefore, with suﬃciently many sales, the expectation of the herding type S will move
below the ask price so that type S will no longer buy. This ends herding.
The intuition for the buy contrarian case is analogous except that the eﬀect of further
buys and further sales work in the opposite direction.
Next, we show that with MLRP large price movements are consistent with both herding
and contrarianism. In fact, the range of price movements in both cases can include (almost)
the entire set of feasible prices. Speciﬁcally, for buy herding the range of feasible prices
is [V2,V3] and for buy contrarianism the range is [V1,V2].30 As argued above, with MLRP
buys increase prices, and sales decrease prices. Furthermore, by Proposition 4, buy herding
persists when there are only buys and buy contrarianism persists when there are only sales.
Thus, once buy herding starts, a large number of buys can induce prices to rise to levels
arbitrarily close to V3 without ending buy herding, and once buy contrarianism starts, large
numbers of sales can induce prices to fall to levels arbitrarily close to V1 without ending
buy contrarianism.
We complete the analysis by showing that there exists a set of priors on V such that
herding and contrarianism can start when prices are close to the middle value, V2. Together
with the arguments in the last paragraph, we have that herding and contrarian prices can
span almost the entire range of feasible prices. Formally, we have the following.
Proposition 5 Let signals obey MLRP.
(a) Consider any history Hr = (a1,...,ar−1) at which there is buy herding (contrarian-
ism). Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists history Ht = (a1,...,at−1) following Hr such
that there is buy herding (contrarianism) at every Hτ = (a1,...,aτ−1), r ≤ τ ≤ t,
and E[V |Hr+τ] exceeds V3 − ǫ (is less than V1 + ǫ).
(b) Suppose the assumptions in Theorem 2 that ensure buy herding (contrarianism) hold.
Then for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that if Pr(V2) > 1−δ there is a history
Ht = (a1,...,at−1) and a date r < t such that (i) there is buy herding (contrarianism)
at every Hτ =(a1,...,aτ−1), r ≤ τ ≤ t, (ii) E[V |Hr]<V2+ǫ (E[V |Hr] >V2−ǫ) and
(iii) E[V |Ht] > V3 − ǫ (E[V |Ht] > V1 + ǫ).
The results of this section (and the ones in the next section on volatility) assume that the in-
formation structure satisﬁes the well behaved case of MLRP. This ensures that the probabil-
ities of buys and the sales are uniformly increasing and decreasing in V (see Lemma 5 (iv)).
As a result, we have that the relative probability qt
1/qt
ℓ falls with buys and rises with sales
for all ℓ = 2,3, and the opposite holds for qt
3/qt
ℓ for all ℓ = 1,2. This monotonicity in the
relative probabilities of the extreme states is the feature that allows us to establish our
persistence and fragility results. If MLRP were not to hold, then the probability of buys
30The reason is, by Lemma 3, at any date t buy herding implies qt
3 > qt
1, buy contrarian implies qt
1 > qt
3.
24and sales may not be monotonic in V , and the results of this section may not hold.31 An
example of this is the herding example in Avery and Zemsky (1998); see Section 10.
8 The Impact of Social Learning on Volatility and Liquidity
In this section we are concerned with the impact of social learning on price movements. In
particular, we ask the following questions: Do buys move prices more with than without
social learning? Will sales move prices more with than without social learning?
To address these questions we compare price movements in our set-up with those in a
hypothetical benchmark economy in which informed traders do not switch behaviour. This
economy is identical to our set-up except that each informed type always takes the same
action as the one he chooses at the initial history (before receiving any public information).
Consequently, in the hypothetical benchmark economy informed traders act as if they do
not observe prices and past actions of others. We thus refer to this world as the opaque
market and discuss examples for such situations at the end of the section. In contrast,
in the standard setting traders observe and learn from the actions of their predecessors.
To highlight the diﬀerence, in this section we refer to the standard case as the transpar-
ent market. In both the transparent and the opaque economies, the market maker correctly
accounts for traders’ behaviour when setting prices.
Volatility. We show that with MLRP signals, at any histories at which either herding
or contrarianism occurs, trades move prices more in the transparent market than in the
opaque one. We found it interesting that larger price movements in the transparent market
occur both after buys and after sales. Moreover, the result holds for MLRP information
structures which, taken at face value, are “well-behaved.”
We present the result for the case of buy herding and buy contrarianism; the results
for sell herding and sell contrarianism are identical and will thus be omitted. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁx any history Hr at which buy herding starts and consider the diﬀerence between the
most recent transaction price in the transparent market with that in the opaque market
at any buy herding history that follows Hr. Assuming MLRP signals, we show (a) that
the diﬀerence between the two prices is positive if the history since Hr consists of only
buys, (b) that the diﬀerence is negative if the history since Hr consists of only sales and
the number of sales is not too large,32 and (c) that the diﬀerence is positive if the history
following Hr is such that the number of buys is arbitrarily large relative to the number of
sales. We also show an analogous result for buy contrarianism.
31The monotonicity of the probability of buys and sales in V can hold under weaker conditions than
MLRP. For example, we could assume existence of a strictly increasing and a strictly decreasing signal.
All the results of this paper with MLRP also hold with this weaker assumption.
32Note that, by Proposition 5, buy herding cannot persist with an arbitrarily large number of sales.
25Formally, for any history Ht let Eo[V |Ht], qt
i,o, βt
i,o and σt
i,o be respectively the market
expectation, the probability of Vi, the probability of a buy in state Vi and the probability
of a sale in state Vi in the opaque market at Ht. Then we can show the following.
Proposition 6 Assume MLRP. Consider any ﬁnite history Hr = (a1,...,ar−1) at which
the priors in the two markets coincide: qr
i = qr
i,o for i = 1,2,3. Suppose that Hr is followed
by b ≥ 0 buys and s ≥ 0 sales in some order; denote this history by Ht = (a1 ...,ar+b+s−1).
(1) Assume that there is buy herding at Hτ, for every τ = r,...,r + b + s.
(a)Suppose s = 0. Then E[V |Ht] > Eo[V |Ht] for any b > 0.
(b) Suppose b = 0. Then there exists s ≥ 1 such that E[V |Ht] < Eo[V |Ht] for any s ≤ s.
(c) For any s there exists b such that E[V |Ht] > Eo[V |Ht] for any b > b.
(2) Assume that there is buy contrarianism at Hτ, for every τ = r,...,r + b + s.
(a)Suppose b = 0. Then E[V |Ht] < Eo[V |Ht] for any s > 0.
(b) Suppose s = 0. Then there exists b ≥ 1 such that E[V |Ht] > Eo[V |Ht] for any b ≤ b.
(c) For any b there exists s such that E[V |Ht] < Eo[V |Ht] for any s > s.
The critical element in demonstrating the result is the U-shaped nature of the herding
candidate’s signal and the Hill-shaped nature of the contrarian candidate’s signal in com-
bination with the public belief once herding/contrarianism starts. To see this consider any
buy herding history Ht = (a1,...,ar+b+s−1) satisfying the above proposition for the case
described in part (1) — the arguments for a buy contrarian history described in part (2) are
analogous. Then the prices in the transparent and opaque markets diﬀer because at any buy
herding history in the transparent market the market maker assumes that the buy herding
candidate S buys whereas in the opaque market the market maker assumes that S sells.33
Since the buy herding type must have a U-shaped signal we also have Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2).
Then the following must hold: (i) the market maker upon observing a buy increases his
belief about the likelihood of V3 relative to that of V2 faster in the transparent market
(where S is a buyer) than in the opaque market (where S is a seller) and (ii) the market
maker upon observing a sale decreases his belief about the likelihood of V3 relative to V2
faster in the transparent market than in the opaque market. Now if it is also the case that
the likelihood of V1 is small relative to that of V3 in both worlds, then it follows from (i)
and (ii), respectively, that the market expectation (which is the most recent transaction
price) in the transparent market exceeds that in the opaque market after a buy and it is
less after a sale.
At Hr in both markets the likelihoods of each state coincide (qr
i = qr
i,o); moreover the
likelihood of V1 in both markets is small relative to that V3 (to ensure buy herding). Then
the following two conclusions follow from the discussion in the previous paragraph: First,
if Ht involves only a single buy after Hr (i.e. if s = 0 and b = 1) then E[V |Ht] > Eo[V |Ht].
33If we assume S1 < S2 < S3, then with MLRP the buy herding (buy contrarian) candidate must be S2.
26Second, if Ht involves only a single sale after Hr (i.e. if b = 0 and s = 1) then E[V |Ht] <
Eo[V |Ht]. Part 1(b) follows from the latter. To complete the intuition for 1(a) and 1(c),
note that further buys after Hr reduce the probabilities of V1 relative to V3 in both markets
(see Lemma 5 (iv)). Thus if either the history after Hr involves no sales (as in part 1(a))
or if the number of buys is large relative to the number of sales (as in part 1(c)) then the
ﬁrst conclusion is reinforced, and E[V |Ht] remains above Eo[V |Ht] after any such histories.
Notice that with MLRP, any sale beyond Hr increases the probability of V1 relative
to V3 (and relative to V2) both in the transparent and in the opaque market. Furthermore,
the increase may be larger in the latter than in the former. As a result, for the buy herding
case we cannot show that in general prices in the transparent market fall more than in the
opaque market after any arbitrary number of sales. However, if the relative likelihood of a
sale in state V1 to V3 in the transparent market is no less than that in the opaque market,
i.e. (σ1/σ3) ≥ (σ1,o/σ3,o), then we can extend the conclusion in part 1(b) to show that the
price in the transparent market falls more than in the opaque market after any arbitrary
number of sales (the proof is in the supplementary material).34
Proposition 6 of course does not address the likelihood of a buy or a sale after herding
or contrarianism begins. It is important to note, however, that once buy herding or buy
contrarianism starts there will also be more buys in the transparent market compared to the
opaque market because the herding type buys at such histories. Thus, given the conclusions
of Proposition 6, price paths must have a stronger upward bias in the transparent market
than in the opaque market.
Finally, it is often claimed that herding generates excess volatility whereas contrarian-
ism tends to stabilize markets because the contrarian types act against the crowd. The
conclusions of this section are consistent with the former claim but contradict the latter.
Both herding and contrarianism increase price movements compared to the opaque market
and they do so for similar reasons — namely because of the U-shaped nature of the herding
type’s csd and the Hill-shaped nature of the contrarian type’s csd.
Liquidity. In sequential trading models in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
liquidity is measured by the bid-ask-spread as a larger spread implies higher adverse selec-
tion costs and thus lower liquidity. Since at any date market expectations after a buy and
market expectations after a sale respectively coincide with the ask and the bid price at the
previous date, the next corollary to Proposition 6 follows:
Corollary At any history Ht at which type S engages in buy herding or buy contrarianism,
(a) the ask price when the buy herding or buy contrarian candidate S rationally buys
exceeds the ask price when he chooses not to buy,
(b) the bid price when the buy herding or buy contrarian candidate S rationally buys
34The condition (σ1/σ3) ≥ (σ1,o/σ3,o) is satisﬁed if, e.g., the bias of the herding candidate is close to zero.
27is lower than the bid price when he chooses to sell.
Part (a) of the result follows from Proposition 6 (1a) and (2b) when b = 1 and Part (b)
follows from Proposition 6 (1b) and (2a) when s = 1.35 The above corollary implies that
in equilibrium liquidity (as measured by the bid-ask spread) is lower when some informed
types herd or act as a contrarian than when they do not.
Interpretation of the Opaque Market and the Volatility Result. One can
think of the traders in the opaque market as automata that always buy or sell depending
on their signals. One justiﬁcation for such naive behaviour is that traders do not observe
or remember the public history of actions and prices (including current prices).
Alternatively, the non-changing behaviour may represent actions of rational traders in
a trading mechanism where traders submit their orders through a market maker some time
before the orders get executed. The market maker would receive these orders in some
sequence and he would execute them sequentially at prices which reﬂect all the information
contained in the orders received so far. The actions of other traders and the prices are
unknown at the time of the order submission and thus, as in the opaque market, the order of
each trader is independent of these variables.36 As traders eﬀectively commit to a particular
trade before any information is revealed, the price sequence in this alternative model would
coincide with the price sequence in the opaque market that we depict above. Therefore,
Proposition 6 can also be used to claim that volatility is greater in the transparent market
than in this alternative set-up in which all orders are submitted before any execution.
A slightly more transparent market than the opaque one is one where each trader with
herding/contrarian signal S compares his prior expectations, E[V |S], with the current price
and buys if E[V |S] exceed the ask price, sells if E[V |S] is less than the bid price and does
not trade otherwise. In this “almost opaque” market there is a diﬀerent kind of non-
transparency in that at each period the traders do not observe or recall past actions and
prices but they know the bid and ask prices at that period; furthermore they act semi-
rationally by comparing their private expectation with current prices without learning
about the liquidation value from the current price (e.g., for cognitive reasons).
For the case of herding, the same excess volatility result as in part (1) of Proposition 6
holds if we compare the transparent market with the above almost opaque market. To see
this note that at the initial history H1 every buy herding type sells. Also, at every buy
herding history the prices are higher than at H1; therefore in an almost opaque market the
35We show in the appendix, that the proof of Proposition 6 in these cases does not require MLRP. Thus,
the corollary is stated without assuming MLRP information structure; see footnotes 45 and 46.
36A possible example of such mechanism is a market after a “circuit breaker” is introduced. The latter
triggers a trading halt after “large” movements in stock prices. Before trading recommences, traders submit
their orders without knowing others’ actions. We thank Markus Brunnermeier for this interpretation.
28herding type must also sell at every buy herding history.37 Since Proposition 6 compares
price volatility only at histories at which buy herding occurs, it follows that the same excess
volatility result holds if we compare the transparent with the almost opaque market.
9 Herding and Contrarianism with Many States
Our results intuitively extend to cases with more signals and more values. In fact, with
three states and an arbitrary number of signals our characterization results, in terms of U-
shaped signals for herding and Hill-shaped signals for contrarianism, and all our conclusions
in the previous two sections with respect to fragility, persistence, large price movements,
liquidity and price volatility remain unchanged.38
With more than three states, U shape and Hill shape are no longer the only possible
signal structures that can lead to herding and contrarianism. The intuition for our re-
sults with many states does, however, remain the same: the herding type must distribute
probability weight to the tails, the contrarian types must distribute weight to the middle.
Assume there are N > 2 states and N signals. Denote the value of the asset in state j
by Vj and assume that V1 ≤ V2 ≤ ... ≤ VN. Signal S is said to have an increasing csd if
Pr(S|Vi) ≤ Pr(S|Vi+1) for all i = 1,...,N −1 and a decreasing csd if Pr(S|Vi) ≥ Pr(S|Vi+1)
for all i = 1,...,N − 1.






(Vi+j − Vi)   qiqi+j[Pr(S|Vi+j) − Pr(S|Vi)]. (7)
For an increasing csd, (7) is always non-negative since Pr(S|Vi+j)−Pr(S|Vi) is non-negative
for all i,j; similarly, for decreasing csds, (7) is always non-positive since Pr(S|Vi+j) −
Pr(S|Vi) is non-positive for all i,j. Therefore, an increasing or decreasing type cannot switch
behaviour and we have the following necessity result which is analogous to Proposition 1.
Lemma 6 An increasing or decreasing S never switches from buying to selling or vice versa.
Next, we describe two suﬃcient conditions that yield herding and contrarianism that
have a similar ﬂavour as our suﬃciency results in Section 5. We will focus only on buy
herding and buy contrarianism; sell herding and sell contrarianism are analogous.
In line with the previous analysis we assume for the remainder of this section that
the values of the asset are distinct in each state and that they are on an equal grid.
37Since at a buy contrarian history prices are lower than at the initial history, the same claim cannot be
made for the contrarian case.
38With three states, Hill and U shape are still well-deﬁned, irrespective of the number of signals; even
with a continuum of signals these concepts can be deﬁned in terms of conditional densities.
29Moreover, we assume that the prior probability distribution is symmetric. Thus we set
{V1,V2,...,VN} = {0,V,2V,..., (N − 1)V} and Pr(Vi) = Pr(VN+1−i) for all i.
We begin with the analysis of the decision problem of selling at H1 and generalize the
concept of a negative bias as follows. Signal S is said to have a negative bias if for any pair of
values that are equally far from the middle value, the signal happens more frequently when
the true value is the smaller one than when it is the larger one: Pr(S|Vi) > Pr(S|VN+1−i)
for all i < (N + 1)/2. In the supplementary material we show that this property ensures
that E[V |S] < E[V ]. This means, by a similar argument as with the three values case, that
a negatively biased S must be selling at H1 if   is suﬃciently small.
Next we generalize the suﬃcient conditions for switching to buying at some history.
Recall that in the three value case, we considered histories at which the probability of
one extreme value was small to the point where it can be eﬀectively ignored. Then the
expectation of the informed exceeds that of the market if the informed puts more weight
on the larger remaining value than on the smaller remaining one.
The suﬃcient conditions that we describe for the switches in the general case have a
similar intuition and are very simple as we impose restrictions only on the most extreme
values. Speciﬁcally, to ensure buy herding we assume Pr(S|VN−1) < Pr(S|VN) and consider
histories at which the probabilities of all values are small relative to the two largest val-
ues VN−1 and VN. Since at such histories all but the two largest values can be ignored it
must be that the price must have risen and the expectation of type S must exceed that of
the public expectation if Pr(S|VN−1) < Pr(S|VN). If in addition the bid-ask spread is not
too large (enough noise trading), the expectation of S will also exceed the ask price at Ht
and type S switches from selling to buying after a price rise. Similarly, to ensure buy con-
trarianism we assume Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2) and consider histories at which the probabilities
of all values are small relative to the two smallest ones V1 and V2. Since at such histories all
but the two smallest values can be ignored and the price must have fallen, the expectation
of type S must exceed that of the public expectation if Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2). If in addition
the bid-ask spread is not too large at such histories then S switches from selling to buying
after a price fall. Formally, we can show the following analogous result to Lemma 4.
Lemma 7 (i) Suppose S is negatively biased and satisﬁes Pr(S|VN−1) < Pr(S|VN). Then
there exists a  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S buy herds if   <  bh and if
For all ǫ > 0 exists H




l < ǫ for all l = N − 1,N and i < N − 1. (8)
(ii) Suppose S is negatively biased and satisﬁes Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2). Then there exists a
 bc ∈ (0,1] such that S is a buy contrarian if   <  bc and if
For all ǫ > 0 exists H




l < ǫ for all l = 1,2 and i > 2. (9)
The simplest way of ensuring the existence of histories that satisfy (8) and (9) is to assume
MLRP. Then, as in Lemma 5 (iv) for the three states case, the probability of a buy is
30increasing and the probability of a sale is decreasing in V . As a result, with MLRP we can
always ensure (8) by considering histories that contain a suﬃciently large number of buys
and (9) by considering histories that contain a suﬃciently large number of sales. Hence,
Lemma 7 yields the following for buy herding and buy contrarianism.39
Theorem 3 Assume MLRP and suppose signal S is negatively biased.
(a) If Pr(S|VN−1) < Pr(S|VN) then there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S buy herds if   <  bh.
(b) If Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2) there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S is a buy contrarian if   <  bh.
The description in this section has assumed that each state is associated with a unique liq-
uidation value of the underlying security. There can be, however, other uncertainties that
do not aﬀect the liquidation value but that do have an impact on the price. One example
is a situation in which some agents may have superior information about the distribution
of information in the economy (e.g., as in Avery and Zemsky’s (1998) “composition uncer-
tainty;” see the next section). In the supplementary appendix we prove all the suﬃciency
results from this section for such a generalized set-up.
10 Avery and Zemsky (1998)
As mentioned in the literature review, Avery and Zemsky (1998), AZ, argue that herd
behaviour with informationally eﬃcient asset prices is not possible unless signals are “non-
monotonic” and uncertainty is “multi-dimensional.” AZ reach their conclusions by (i)
showing that herding is not possible when the information structure satisﬁes their deﬁnition
of monotonicity and (ii) providing an example of herding that has “multi-dimensional
uncertainty.” In this section, we explain why our conclusions diﬀer from theirs. We will
also discuss the issue of price movements (or lack thereof) in their examples.
AZ’s conclusion with respect to monotonicity arises because their adopted deﬁnition
is non-standard and excludes herding almost by assumption. Speciﬁcally, they deﬁne a
monotonic information structure as one that satisﬁes the following:
∀S, ∃w s.t. ∀H
t, E(V |H
t,S) is weakly between w and E(V |H
t). (10)
This deﬁnition does not imply nor is implied by the standard MLRP deﬁnition of mono-
tonicity. Also, in contrast to MLRP, it is not a condition on the primitives of the signal
distribution. Instead, it is a requirement on endogenous variables that must hold for all
39Conditions that ensure sell herding and sell contrarian are deﬁned analogously. In particular, to ensure
the initial buy we need to assume a positive bias Pr(S|Vi) < Pr(S|VN+1−i) for all i < (N + 1)/2. For the
switches we reverse the two conditions that ensure switching for buy herding and buy contrarian: for sell
herding we need Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2), for sell contrarian we need Pr(S|VN−1) > Pr(S|VN).
31trading histories.40 Furthermore, it precludes herding almost by deﬁnition.41
AZ’s example of herding uses Event Uncertainty, a concept ﬁrst introduced by Easley
and O’Hara (1992). Speciﬁcally, in their example, the value of the asset and the signals can
take three values {0, 1
2,1} and the information structure can be described by the following:
Pr(S|V ) V1 = 0 V2 = 1
2 V3 = 1
S1 = 0 p 0 1 − p
S2 = 1
2 0 1 0
S3 = 1 1 − p 0 p
for some p > 1/2. The idea behind the notion of event uncertainty as used by AZ is that
ﬁrst, informed agents know if something (an event) has happened (they know whether
V = V2 or V ∈ {V1,V3}). Second, they receive noisy information with precision p about how
this event has inﬂuenced the asset’s liquidation value. This two stage information structure
makes the uncertainty “multi-dimensional.” Thus multi-dimensionality is equivalent to
informed traders having a ﬁner information partition than the market maker. AZ attribute
herding to this feature of their example.
Multi-dimensionality is, however, neither necessary nor suﬃcient for herding and it is
relevant to herding only to the extent that it may generate U-shaped signals. First, since
AZ’s example has three states and three signals, it is a special case of our main setup, and
our characterization results apply. Speciﬁcally, the two herding types in AZ’s example are
S1 and S3. In addition to having ﬁner partitions of the state space than the market maker,
both types are also U-shaped and so our Proposition 3 explains the possibility of buy-
herding by S1 and sell-herding by S3.42 Second, our Proposition 3 demonstrates that there
would also be herding if the AZ example is changed in such a way that all signals occur
with positive probability in all states, while maintaining the U-shaped nature of signals
S1 and S3.43 Such an information structure is no longer multi-dimensional (the informed
trader’s partition would be the same as the market maker’s). Third, consider an information
40Condition (10) does not imply that each signal has a increasing or decreasing csd; however, one can to
show that if every signal has either a strictly increasing or a strictly decreasing csd then the information
structure satisﬁes (10).
41For example, for buy herding by type S to occur at some history Ht we must have E[V |S] < E[V ] and
a subsequent price rise E[V ] < E[V |Ht]; but then (10) implies immediately that w < E[V |Ht,S] < E[V |Ht]
and hence buy herding by S at Ht is not possible.
42In AZ’s example not all signals arise in all states (in states V1 and V3 only signals S1 and S3 arise, in
state V2 only signal S2 arises). Thus when there is herding (by types S1 or S3), all informed types that
occur with positive probability act alike. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in AZ’s example herding
does not constitute an informational cascade since at any history not all types take the same action. The
reason is that it is never common knowledge that there is herding. Instead, at any ﬁnite history the market
maker attaches non-zero probability to all three states and thus he always attaches non-zero probability
to the state in which some trades are made by type S2. Moreover, the market expects that when type S1
buy-herds, type S2 sells, when type S3 sell-herds, type S2 buys. See also our discussion in Footnote 17.
43For example, take Pr(Si|Vi) = p(1−ǫ) , Pr(S2|Vi) = Pr(Si|V2) = ǫ, for all i = 1,3 for 0 < ǫ < (1−p)/2.
32structure for which signals S1 and S3 are such that informed traders know whether or not
V = 0 has occurred (and the market did not). Such signals are multidimensional (they
generate a ﬁner partition), but they are not U-shaped and thus do not admit herding.
Our general analysis with three states also provides us with an appropriate framework to
understand the nature of histories that generate herding and contrarianism. For example,
as we explained in Section 7, to induce buy herding the trading history must be such
that the probabilities of the lowest state V1 is suﬃciently small relative to the two other
states. With MLRP, such beliefs arise after very simple histories consisting of a suﬃciently
large number of buys. In AZ’s example, one also needs to generate such beliefs, but the
trading histories that generate them are more complicated and involve a large number holds
followed by a large number of buys.44
Turning to price movements, in AZ’s event uncertainty example herding has limited
capacity to explain price volatility as herding is fragile and price movements during herding
are strictly limited. To allow for price movements during herding, AZ introduce a further
level of informational uncertainty to their event uncertainty example. Speciﬁcally, they
assume additionally that for each signal there are high and low quality informed traders.
They also assume that there is uncertainty about the proportion of each type of informed
trader. AZ claim that this additional level of uncertainty, which they label composition
uncertainty, complicates learning and allows for large price movements during a buy herding
phase (they do this by simulation).
A state of the world in AZ’s example with composition uncertainty refers to both the
liquidation value of the asset and the proportion of diﬀerent types of informed traders in
the market (the latter inﬂuences the prices). Thus, there is more than one state associated
with a given value V of the asset. This example is, therefore, formally a special case of the
multi-state version of our model and the possibility of herding follows from Lemma IV in
the supplementary material. More speciﬁcally, our result establishes that to ensure herding
in AZ’s example with composition uncertainty we need the analogue of U-shaped signals
with the property that the probability of a signal in each state with V = 1/2 is less than
the probability of the signal in each of the states with V = 0 or with V = 1. This is indeed
the case in the example with composition uncertainty. Therefore, herding there is also due
to U-shaped signals. (See the discussion in Section F of the Supplementary Appendix.)
To understand the diﬀerences in price movements and persistence, recall our discussion
of fragility in Section 7 with regards to buy herding by type S at some history Ht. The





must be suﬃciently small to start herding, and these relative probabilities need to remain
44The holds bring down the probability of V1 relative to V2 and the number of buys is chosen to bring
down the probability of V1 relative to V3 suﬃciently while not increasing the probability of V1 relative to V2
by too much. Formally, their construction is similar to Subcase D2 in the proof of our Proposition 3.
33small for herding to persist beyond Ht. With MLRP, since Pr(buy|V ) is increasing in V ,




3; at the same time further buys increase prices.
Thus herding can persist and prices can move signiﬁcantly.
In AZ’s example without composition uncertainty, while buys result in price increases,
during any buy herding phase we have that Pr(buy|V2) < Pr(buy|V1) = Pr(buy|V3). Thus,
once buy herding begins, further buys cannot ensure that the relative probabilities of V1
remain low as buys increase qt
1/qt
2, while leaving qt
1/qt
3 unaﬀected. Hence, buys during
buy herding in AZ’s example without composition uncertainty are self-defeating. In AZ’s
example with composition uncertainty we have that Pr(buy|V2) < Pr(buy|V1) < Pr(buy|V3)
once herding starts. Further buys during herding thus reduce qt
1/qt
3 while increasing qt
1/qt
2.
As the former oﬀsets somewhat the eﬀect of the latter, buy herding may persist (and allow
price increases) for longer than without composition uncertainty.
In conclusion, what makes herding less fragile and more consistent with signiﬁcant price
movements, are the relative probabilities of a speciﬁc trade in the diﬀerent states of the
world and not so much the addition of extra dimensions of uncertainty. In fact, when the
probability of a buy is increasing in the value of the asset, buy herding is least fragile and
most consistent with large price movements. As we have shown, this can happen with
only three states, without diﬀerent dimensions of uncertainty and with “well behaved”
information structures satisfying MLRP.
11 Extensions, Discussion and Conclusion
Herding and contrarian behaviour are examples of history-dependent behaviour that may
manifest itself in real market data as momentum or mean-reversion. Understanding the
causes for the behaviour that underlie the data can thus help interpret these important non-
stationarities. In the ﬁrst part of this paper we characterized speciﬁc circumstances under
which herding and contrarian behaviour can and cannot occur in markets with eﬃcient
prices. In the second part, we showed that both herding and contrarianism can be consistent
with large movement in prices and that they both can reduce liquidity and increase volatility
relative to situations where these kinds of social learning are absent.
In the early literature on informational social learning (e.g. Banerjee (1992)) herding
was almost a generic outcome and would arise, loosely, with any kinds of signals. Herding
as deﬁned in our setup does not arise under all circumstances but only under those that
we specify here. Namely, the underlying information generating process must be such that
there are some signals that people receive under extreme outcomes more frequently than
under moderate outcomes. Therefore, to deter herding, mixed messages predicting extreme
outcomes (U-shaped signal) should be avoided.
It is important to note that, depending on the information structure, the prevalence
34of types who herd (or act as contrarians) can vary, and in some cases they can be very
substantial. For example, consider the MLRP information structure in Table 1 when S2 is
U-shaped. Then, in any state the likelihood that an informed trader is a herding type S2 has
lower bound α. This bound can range between zero and one. Thus, when α is suﬃciently
close to 1, the likelihood that an informed trader is a herding type is arbitrarily close to 1
and the impact of herding switches can then be very signiﬁcant.
In this paper, we have presented the results for which we were able to obtain clear-cut
analytical results. In the supplementary material, we also explore other implications with
numerical simulations. First, an important implication of our analysis for applied research is
that when social learning arises according to our deﬁnition, simple summary statistics such
as the number of buys and sales are not suﬃcient statistics for trading behaviour. Instead,
as some types of traders change their trading modes during herding or contrarianism, prices
become history-dependent. Thus as the entry order of traders is permutated, prices with
the same population of traders can be strikingly diﬀerent, as we illustrate with numerical
examples. Second, herding results in price paths that are very sensitive to changes in some
key parameters. Speciﬁcally, in the case with MLRP, comparing the situation where the
proportion of informed agents is just below the critical levels described in Theorem 2 with
that where the proportion is just above that threshold (so there is no herding), prices
deviate substantially in the two cases. Third, herding slows down the convergence to the
true value if the herd moves away from that true value, but it accelerates convergence if
the herd moves into the right direction.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
To save space we shall prove the result for the case of buy herding and buy contrarian; the
proof for the sell cases are analogous. Thus suppose that S buy herds or acts as a buy
contrarian at some Ht. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: S has a negative bias: Buy herding and buy contrarian imply E[V |S] < bid1.
Since bid1 < E[V ] we must have E[V |S] < E[V ]. Then by Lemma 2, S has a negative bias.
Step 2: (Pr(S|V1) − Pr(S|V2))(qt
3 − qt
1) > 0: It follows from the deﬁnition of buy
herding and buy contrarian that E[V |S,Ht] > ask
t. Since E[V |Ht] < ask
t we must have
E[V |S,Ht] > E[V |Ht]. By Lemma 1, this implies that (2) is positive at Ht. Also, by the
negative bias (Step 1), the third term in (2) is negative. Therefore, the sum of the ﬁrst two
terms in (2) is positive: qt
3(Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V2)) + qt
1(Pr(S|V2) − Pr(S|V1)) > 0. But this
means, by negative bias, that (Pr(S|V1) − Pr(S|V2))(qt
3 − qt
1) > 0.
Step 3a: If S buy herds at Ht then S is nU-shaped: It follows from the deﬁnition of
buy herding that E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. By Lemma 3, this implies that qt
3 > qt
1. Then it follows
35from Step 2 that Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2). Also, since S buy-herds, by Lemma 1, S cannot
have a decreasing csd and we must have Pr(S|V2) < Pr(S|V3). Thus, S is nU-shaped.
Step 3b: If S acts as a buy contrarian at Ht then S is nHill shaped. It follows from
the deﬁnition of buy contrarian that E[V |Ht] < E[V ]. By Lemma 3, this implies that
qt
3 < qt
1. But then it follows from Step 2 that Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2). Since by Step 1 S has
a negative bias, we have Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V3). Thus S is nHill-shaped.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
First consider the decision problem of type S at H1. If S has a negative bias, by Lemma 2,
E[V |S] < E[V ]. Also, E[V ] − bid
1 > 0 and lim →0 E[V ] − bid
1 = 0. We can thus establish:
Lemma 8 If S has a negative bias, then there exists  i ∈ (0,1] such that E[V |S]−bid
1 < 0
if and only if   <  i.
Simple calculations (see the supplementary material for details) establish the following
useful characterization of the buying decision of type S at any Ht.
Lemma 9 E[V |S,Ht] − ask














To establish buy herding or buy contrarianism we need to show that (11) is positive at
some history Ht. To analyze the sign of the expression in (11) we ﬁrst show that the signs
of the ﬁrst and the second term in (11) are respectively determined by the signs of the
expressions Pr(S|V2)−Pr(S|V1) and Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V2), if and only if   is suﬃciently small.
To establish this, let, for any i = 1,2 and any signal type S′, mi ≡Pr(S|Vi+1) − Pr(S|Vi),





mi−3Mi(S′) if mi and Mi(S′) are non-zero and have opposite signs,
1 otherwise.
Clearly,  i(S′) ∈ (0,1]. Next lemma shows that for some S′,  1(S′) and  2(S′) are respec-
tively the critical bounds on the value of   that characterize the signs of the ﬁrst and the
second terms in (11).
Lemma 10 In any equilibrium the following holds:
(i) Suppose that Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2). Then at any Ht at which S′ buys and S′′  = S,S′
does not, the second term in (11) is positive if and only if   <  2(S′).
(ii) Suppose that Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V1). Then at any Ht at which S′ buys and S′′  = S,S′
does not, the ﬁrst term in (11) is positive if and only if   <  1(S′).
Proof of Lemma 10: First we establish (i). By simple computation, it follows that the
second term in (11) equals γm2+ M2(S′). Also, since in this case Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2), we
have from the deﬁnition of m2 and M2(S′) that γm2+ M2(S′) > 0 if and only if   <  2(S′).
This completes the proof of (i).
36The proofs of (ii) is analogous: By simple computation, it follows that the ﬁrst term
in (11) equals γm1 +  M1(S′). Also, since in this case Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2), we have from
the deﬁnition of m1 and M1(S′) that γm1 +  M1(S′) > 0 if and only if   <  1(S′).
Each of the two cases in Lemma 10 provides a set of conditions that determine the sign
of one of the terms in (11). If the other terms in (11) are suﬃciently small, then these
conditions also determine if S is a buyer. Speciﬁcally, if qt
1 is arbitrarily small relative to qt
2
and qt
3 then the ﬁrst and the last terms are close to zero (as they multiplied by qt
1 and the
second term is not) and can be ignored; thus, at such a history type S buys if the second
term in (11) is positive. Also, if qt
3 is arbitrarily small relative to qt
1 and qt
2 then the last
two terms are close to zero (as they multiplied by qt
3 and the ﬁrst term is not) and can be
ignored; thus, at such history type S buys if the ﬁrst term in (11) is positive.
We can now prove Lemma 4 by appealing to Lemmas 3, 8, and 10 as follows:






Assume also that   <  bh ≡ min{ i, s
bh}. Since by assumption S has a negative bias
and   <  i, it follows from Lemma 8 that S sells at the initial history. Also, since S is
U-shaped we have Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2). Therefore, by   <  s
bh and Lemma 10 (i), there
exists some η > 0 such that the second term in (11) always exceeds η.
By condition (3) there exists a history Ht such that qt
1/qt








2 < η. Then
by the former inequality and Lemma 3 we have E[V |Ht] > E[V ]. Also, since the sum of the

















that the sum must also be greater than −η. This, together with the second term in (11)
exceeding η, implies that (11) is greater than zero, and hence S must be buying at Ht.






and assume that   <  bc ≡ min{ i, s
bc}. Then by the same reasoning as above S sells
at H1. Also, since S has a Hill shape we have Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V1). Therefore, by   <  s
bc
and Lemma 10 (ii), there exists some η > 0 such that the ﬁrst term in (11) always exceeds η.
By condition (4) there exists a history Ht such that qt
3/qt








1 < η. Then
by the former inequality and Lemma 3 we have E[V |Ht] < E[V ]. Also, since the sum of the

















that the sum must also be greater than −η. Since the ﬁrst term in (11) exceeds η, this
implies that (11) is greater than zero, and hence S must be buying at Ht.
37A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Below we provide a proof for part (a) of the proposition; the arguments for the other parts
are analogous and therefore omitted.
The proof of part (a) is by contradiction. Suppose that S is nU-shaped and that all the
other assumptions in part (a) of the proposition hold. Also assume, contrary to the claim
in part (a), that S does not buy herd. Then, by Lemma 4 (i), we have a contradiction if
it can be shown that (3) holds. This is indeed what we establish in the rest of the proof.
First note that the no buy herding supposition implies that S does not buy at any
history Ht. Otherwise, since S has a negative bias, by Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2,
(Pr(S|V1)−Pr(S|V2))(qt
3−qt
1) > 0. Because S is U-shaped this implies that qt
3 > qt
1; but then
since by assumption   <  i, it follows from Lemma 8 that S buy herds; a contradiction.
Next, we describe conditions that ensure that qt
1/qt
l are decreasing in t for any l = 2,3.
Denote an inﬁnite path of actions by H∞ = {a1,a2,...}. For any date t and any ﬁnite
history Ht = {a1,...,at−1}, let at
k be the action that would be taken by type Sk ∈ S\S
at Ht; thus if the informed trader at date t receives a signal Sk ∈ S\S then at, the actual
action taken at Ht, equals at
k. Also denote the action taken by S at Ht by at(S). Then we
have the following.
Lemma 11 Fix any inﬁnite path H∞ = {a1,a2,...} and any signal Sk ∈ S\S. Let Sk′ ∈
S\S be such that Sk′  = Sk. Suppose that at = at







k = at(S) and the inequality Pr(Sk′|Vl) ≤ Pr(Sk′|V1) holds then qt
1/qt
l is non-




k  = at
k′ and at
k  = at(S) and the inequality Pr(Sk|Vl) ≥ Pr(Sk|V1) holds then qt
1/qt
l is
non-increasing; furthermore, if the inequality is strict then qt
1/qt
l is decreasing.











lPr(at|Ht,Vl), to establish that qt
1/qt
l is
decreasing it suﬃces to show that Pr(at|Ht,Vl) is (greater) no less than Pr(at|Ht,V1). Now
consider each of the three cases A. − C.
A. Since signal S is nU-shaped, the combination of Sk and Sk′ is pHill-shaped. This
together with at = at
k = at
k′ imply that Pr(at|Ht,Vl) exceeds Pr(at|Ht,V1).
B. If Pr(Sk′|Vl) ≤ Pr(Sk′|V1) we have Pr(Sk|Vl)+Pr(S|Vl) ≥ Pr(Sk|V1)+Pr(S|V1). This,
together with at = at
k = at(S) imply that Pr(at|Ht,Vl) ≥ Pr(at|Ht,V1). Furthermore, the
latter inequality must be strict if Pr(Sk′|Vl) were less than Pr(Sk′|V1).
C. If Pr(Sk|Vl) ≥ Pr(Sk|V1) and at
k  = at
k′ and at
k  = at(S) we have immediately that
Pr(at|Ht,Vl) ≥ Pr(at|Ht,V1). Furthermore, the latter inequality is strict if Pr(Sk|Vl) were
less than Pr(Sk|V1). This concludes the proof of Lemma 11.
Now we show that (3) holds and thereby obtain the required contradiction. This will
be done for each feasible csd combination of signals.
38Case A: Either there exists a signal that is decreasing or there are two Hill-
shaped signals each with a non-negative bias.
Consider an inﬁnite path of actions consisting of an inﬁnite number of buys. We demon-





decreasing, and hence converge to zero (note that there are a ﬁnite number of states and
signals). We show this in several steps.




3 are both decreasing
at any t: Since S does not buy at any t, this follows immediately from Lemma 11.A.
Step 2: If exactly one informed type buys at period t then (i) qt
1/qt
2 is decreasing and (ii)
qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing if the informed type that buys has a non-zero bias, and is non-increasing
otherwise: Let Si be the only type that buys at t. This implies that Si cannot be decreasing;
therefore, by assumption, Si must be pHill-shaped and the step follows from Lemma 11.C.
Step 3: If a type has a zero bias he cannot be a buyer at any date t: Suppose not. Then






1) > 0. (14)
Also, by Steps 1 and 2, qt
1/qt










3 are both decreasing at any t. This follows Steps 1-3.
Case B: There exists an increasing Si s.t. Pr(Si|Vk)  = Pr(Si|Vk′) for some k and k′.
Let Sj be the third signal other than S and Si. Now we obtain (3) in two steps.
Step 1: If Pr(Si|V1) = Pr(Si|V2) then for any ǫ > 0 there exists a ﬁnite history Hτ =
{a1,...,aτ−1} such that qτ
1/qτ
2 < ǫ. Consider an inﬁnite path H∞ = {a1,a2,...} such
that at = at
j (recall that at
j is the action taken by Sj at history Ht = (a1,...,at−1)).
Note that S is nU-shaped and Pr(Si|V1) = Pr(Si|V2) < Pr(Si|V3). Therefore, Pr(Sj|V2) >
max{Pr(Sj|V1),Pr(Sj|V3)}.
Then it follows from Lemma 11 that qt
1/qt
2 is decreasing if at  = at(S) and it is constant
if at = at(S). To establish the claim it suﬃces to show that at  = at(S) inﬁnitely often.
Suppose not. Then there exists T such that for all t > T, at
j = at(S). Since type S does
not buy at any date and there cannot be more than one informed type holding at any date
(there is always a buyer or a seller), we must have Sj (and S) selling at at every t > T.










[Pr(Sj|V3) − Pr(Sj|V1)] < 0. (15)
for all t > T. Also, by Pr(Si|V1) = Pr(Si|V2) < Pr(Si|V3) we have Pr(Sj|Vl) + Pr(S|Vl) >




l → 0 as t → ∞ for any l = 1,2. This,
together with Pr(Sj|V2) > Pr(Sj|V1), contradict (15).
39Step 2: For any ǫ > 0 there exists a history Ht s.t. qt
1/qt
l < ǫ for any l = 2,3: Fix
any ǫ > 0. Let Hτ be such that qτ
1/qτ
2 < ǫ if Pr(Si|V1) = Pr(Si|V2) (by the previous step
such a history exists) and be the empty history H1, otherwise. Consider any inﬁnite path
H∞ = {Hτ,aτ,aτ+1,....}, where for any t ≥ τ, at is the action that type Si takes at history
Ht = {Hτ,aτ,...,at−1}; i.e. we ﬁrst have the history Hτ and then we look at a subsequent
history that consists only of the actions that type Si takes.
Since Si is increasing it follows from Proposition 1 that at any history Si does not sell.
Also, by the supposition S does not buy at any history. Therefore, Si and S always diﬀer
at every history Ht with t ≥ τ (there cannot be more than one type holding). But since at
is the action that type Si takes at history Ht, Si is increasing and Pr(Si|Vk)  = Pr(Si|Vk′)








2 is non-increasing. This, together with qτ
1/qτ
2 < ǫ when Pr(Si|V1) =
Pr(Si|V2), establishes that there exists t such that qt
1/qt
l < ǫ for any l = 2,3.
Case C: There are two Hill-shaped signals and one has a negative bias.
Let Si be the Hill-shaped signal with the negative bias. Also, let Sj be the other
Hill-shaped signal. Since both S and Si have negative biases, Sj must have a positive bias.







γ +  Pr(Si|Vl)
γ +  Pr(Si|Vm)
,
γ +  (1 − Pr(S|Vl))
γ +  (1 − Pr(S|Vm))
,
γ +  Pr(Sj|Vl)
γ +  Pr(Sj|Vm)
￿
. (16)
Since both Si and Sj are Hill-shaped we have ϕ12 < 1. This implies that there exists an
integer M > 0 and δ ∈ (0,ǫ) such that y(ϕ12)M < ǫ and δ(ϕ13)M < ǫ.
Consider the inﬁnite path H∞ = {a1,a2,...} where at = at
j at every t. Then we have:
Claim 1: qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing at every t: As Si and Sj have a negative and a positive
bias respectively, by Lemma 11, qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing at every t.
Claim 2: qt
1/qt
2 converge to zero if there exists T such that at
i  = at
j for all t > T:
Since Sj is Hill-shaped this follows immediately from parts A and C of Lemma 11.
Claim 3: There exists a history Hτ s.t. qτ
1/qτ
3 < δ and qτ
1/qτ
2 < y: Suppose not; then
by Claims 1 and 2 there exists a date τ such that qτ
1/qτ
3 < δ and aτ
i = aτ
j. Since S
does not buy at any history, it follows that Si and Sj must be buying at τ (there is
always at least one buyer and seller; thus Si and Sj cannot both be holding at τ). Then,
E[V |Si,Ht] − E[V |Ht] > 0. By Proposition 2, this implies










[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V1)] > 0.





















3 < δ and δ < 1, we have qτ
1/qτ
2 < y. This contradicts the supposition.
To complete the proof for this case, ﬁx any τ and Hτ such that qτ
1/qτ
3 < δ and qτ
1/qτ
2 < y
(by Claim 3 such a history exists). Consider a history H
t
that consists of path Hτ =
(a1,...,aτ−1) followed by M periods of buys. Thus t = τ +M and Ht = {Hτ,a1,...,aM},
where for any m ≤ M, am = buy. Since a buy must be either from Sj or Si or both, it
then follows from the deﬁnitions of ϕ13,M and δ, and from qτ
1/qτ











Mδ < ǫ. (18)
Also, since qτ
1/qτ











My < ǫ. (19)
Since the initial choice of ǫ was arbitrary, (3) follows immediately from (18) and (19).
Case D: There exists a U shaped signal Si ∈ S\S.
Since both S and Si are U shaped it follows that the third signal Sj is Hill shaped.
Moreover, by assumption Sj must have a non-negative bias. To establish (3) ﬁx any ǫ > 0
and consider the two possible subcases that may arise.
Subcase D1: Si has a zero bias. We establish the result in two claims.
Claim 1: There exists a history Hτ such that qτ
1/qτ
3 < ǫ. Consider the inﬁnite path
H∞ = {a1,a2,...} such that at = buy for each t. Since a buy must be either from Sj or
Si or both, and Si has a zero bias, it follows from parts A and C of Lemma 11 that qt
1/qt
3
is non-increasing at every t. Furthermore, qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing if at = at
j. Therefore, the
claim follows if Sj buys inﬁnitely often along the path H∞. To show that the latter is true
suppose it is not; then there exists T such that for all t ≥ T, at
j  = at
i =buy. Then for all
















3Pr(Sj|V1)] < 0, (20)








3 must be decreasing at every t > T. But this
is a contradiction because at every t > T, the last term in (20) is positive: βt
1Pr(Sj|V3) −
βt
3Pr(Sj|V1) = γ(Pr(Sj|V3) − Pr(Sj|V1)) > 0 (the equality follows from Si’s zero bias).
Claim 2: There exists a history Ht such that qt
1/qt
l < ǫ for all l = 2,3: By the previous
claim there exists a history Hτ such that qτ
1/qτ
3 < ǫ. Next, consider a history H∞ =
{Hτ,aτ,aτ+1,...} that consists of path Hτ followed by a sequence of actions {aτ,aτ+1,...}
such that at = at
j at every history Ht = {Hτ,aτ,...,at−1}. Since Si has a zero bias,
it follows from Lemma 11 that at every t > τ, qt
1/qt
3 is non-increasing. Also, we have
qτ
1/qτ
3 < ǫ; therefore we have that at every t > τ, qt
1/qt
3 < ǫ. Furthermore, since S and
41Si are U shaped, and Sj is Hill shaped, by Lemma 11, qt
1/qt
2 is decreasing at every t > τ;
hence there must exists t > τ such that qt
1/qt
2 < ǫ.
Since the initial choice of ǫ was arbitrary, (3) follows from Claim 2.
Subcase D2: Both Si and Sj have non-zero bias.
Consider ﬁrst the inﬁnite path H∞ = {a1,a2,...} such that at = at
j at every history
Ht = {a1,...,at−1}. Then the following claims must hold.
Claim 1: qt
1/qt
2 is decreasing at every t : Since Sj and Si are respectively Hill shaped
and U shaped, it follows from Lemma 11 that qt
1/qt
2 is decreasing.
Claim 2: If Si has a negative bias then qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing at every t: Since Sj has a
positive bias and Si has a negative bias, by Lemma 11, qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing at every t.
Claim 3: If Sj has a positive bias and there exists a period T such that, for all t > T,
at
j = buy then qt
1/qt
3 is decreasing at every t > T: Since Sj has a positive bias and S does
not buy at any date, by Lemma 11, qt
1/qt
3 must be decreasing at every t > T.
Before stating the next claim, consider ϕml deﬁned in (16). If both Si and Sj have
positive biases, ϕ13 < 1. Thus, if Si has a positive bias there exist an integer M such that
(i) (φml)
M < ǫ if Sj has a positive bias and (ii)
￿
γ +  Pr(Si|Vl)
γ +  Pr(Si|Vm)
￿M
< ǫ. (21)
Fix any such M. Then there also exists δ ∈ (0,ǫ) such that
δ(ϕ12)
M < ǫ. (22)
Claim 4: If Sj has a zero bias, then there exists a history Hτ s.t. qτ
1/qτ
2 < δ and
qτ
1/qτ
3 = 1: Since q1
1/q1
3 = 1 it follows that at date 1, Sj holds. By recursion it follows that
at every history Ht = {a1,...,at−1} we have qt
1/qt
3 = 1 and the claim follows from Claim 1.
Claim 5: If both Si and Sj have positive biases, then there exists a history Hτ s.t.
qτ
1/qτ
2 < δ and qτ
1/qτ
3 < x, where δ satisﬁes (21) and
x ≡
[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V2)] + 2ǫ[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V1)]
[Pr(Si|V1) − Pr(Si|V2)]
.
Suppose not. Then by Claims 1 and 3 there exists date τ such that qτ
1/qτ
2 < δ and
aτ
j  = buy. Since S also does not buy at Hτ, it follows that only Si buys at τ. Then
E[V |Si,Hτ] > E[V |Hτ]. By Proposition 2, this implies










[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V1)] > 0.
Since qτ
1/qτ











2 [Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V1)]
Pr(Si|V1) − Pr(Si|V2)
<
[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V2)] + 2ǫ[Pr(Si|V3) − Pr(Si|V1)]
[Pr(Si|V1) − Pr(Si|V2)]
= x.




l < ǫ for
42any l = 2,3. Fix any history Hτ = (a1,...,aτ−1) s.t. qτ
1/qτ
2 < δ and qτ
1/qτ
3 = 1 if Sj has
a zero bias and qτ
1/qτ
2 < δ and qτ
1/qτ
3 < x if Sj has a positive bias (by Claims 4 and 5
such histories exist). Next, consider a history H
t
that consists of path Hτ followed by M
periods of buys. Thus t = τ + M and Ht = {hτ,a1,...,aM}, where for any m ≤ M,
am = buy. Since a buy must be either from Sj or Si or both, it then follows from the
deﬁnitions of ϕ12 in (16), from (22) and from qτ
1/qτ








2 (ϕ12)M < δ(ϕ12)M < ǫ.
To show that qτ
1/qτ
3 < ǫ consider the two cases of Sj having a zero bias and Sj having a
positive bias separately. In the latter case, we have qτ
1/qτ









3 (ϕ13)M < x(ϕ13)M < ǫ. In the former case, since qτ
1/qτ
3 = 1 it must be that
am = a
t+1






3 < 1. Recursively, it then follows that am′
= a
t+1
i  = a
τ+m′
j for










γ+ Pr(Si|Vm))M < ǫ.
Since the initial choice of ǫ was arbitrary, (3) follows from Claims 1,2 and 5.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(a) At Ht buy herding occurs if and only if E[V |S,Ht]−ask
t > 0 and E[V |Ht]−E[V ]>0.
Thus, to demonstrate the existence of the function s, we need to characterize the expressions
E[V |S,Ht] − ask
t and E[V |Ht] − E[V ] for diﬀerent values of b and s.
Let βi = Pr(buy|Vi) and σi = Pr(sale|V3) at every buy herding history (these proba-
bilities are are always the same at every history at which S buy herds). Note that, by
Lemma 9, E[V |S,Ht] − ask

























Also, by MLRP and Lemma 5 (iv) we have
β1 < β2 < β3 and σ3 < σ2 < σ1. (24)
Since by Proposition 2, S must have an nU-shaped csd, it then follows that
β1Pr(S|V2)−β2Pr(S|V1) < 0, β1Pr(S|V3)−β3Pr(S|V1) < 0, β2Pr(S|V3)−β3Pr(S|V2) > 0. (25)
(The last inequality in (25) follows from the ﬁrst two and from (11) being positive at Hr.)
Thus, the ﬁrst and the third terms in (23) are negative, the second is positive. Hence
it follows from (24) that the expression in (23) satisﬁes the following three properties:
(i) it increases in b, (ii) it decreases in s and (iii) for any b it is negative for suﬃciently
large s. By (24), the expression E(V |Ht)− E(V ) must also satisfy (i)-(iii) (note that qt
3/qt
1
is increasing in b and decreasing in s). Since (23) and E(V |Ht)−E(V ) are both increasing
in b and since by assumption there is buy herding at Hr, it must be that for any b both (23)
and E(V |Ht) − E(V ) are positive when s = 0. Thus, it follows from (ii) and (iii) that for
43any b there exists an integer s > 1 such that both (23) and E(V |Ht)−E(V ) are positive for
any integer s < s, and either (23) or E(V |Ht)−E(V ) are non-positive for any integer s ≥ s.
To complete the proof of this part we need to show that s is increasing in b. To show
this suppose otherwise; then there exists b′ and b′′ such that b′ < b′′ and s′ > s′′ where s′
and s′′ are respectively the critical values of sales corresponding to b′ and b′′ described in
the previous paragraph. Now since s′ > s′′ it follows that both (23) and E(V |Ht)−E(V ) are
positive if b = b′ and s = s′′. But since both (23) and E(V |Ht) − E(V ) are increasing in b,
we must then have that both (23) and E(V |Ht) − E(V ) are positive if b = b′′ and s = s′′.
By the deﬁnition of s′′ this is a contradiction.
(b) At Ht buy contrarianism occurs if and only if E[V |S,Ht] − ask
t > 0 and E[V ] −
E[V |Ht] > 0. By Lemma 9, E[V |S,Ht] − ask
t has the same sign as
qr
2qr























Also, with buy contrarianism S must have an nHill-shaped csd and therefore β1Pr(S|V2)−
β2Pr(S|V1) > 0, β1Pr(S|V3)−β3Pr(S|V1) < 0, and β2Pr(S|V3)−β3Pr(S|V2) < 0. Thus, the
second and the third terms in (26) are negative, and the ﬁrst is positive. Hence, by (24),
the expression in (26) satisﬁes the following: (i) it increases in s, (ii) it decreases in b and
(iii) for each s, it is negative for suﬃciently large b.
The expression E(V )−E(V |Ht) also satisﬁes the same three properties. The existence of
the function b is now analogous to that for part (a), with reversed roles for buys and sales.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We show the proof for buy herding; the proof for buy contrarianism is analogous.
(a) In the proof of Proposition 4 we have shown for the case of buy herding that if
the history following Hr consists only of buys, then type S herds at any point during that
history. What remains to be shown is that for an arbitrary number of buys after herding














3 is arbitrarily small at any history Ht that includes a suﬃciently large number of
buys as outlined following conditions (5) and (6). Consequently, for every ǫ > 0, there exists
a history Ht consisting of Hr followed by suﬃciently many buys such that E[V |Ht] > V3−ǫ.
(b) Since the assumptions of Theorem 2 that ensure buy herding hold, S2 must be selling
initially and also   <  s





3Pr(S2|V2)] > η, for every t. (27)
By MLRP, type S1 does not buy at any history. Therefore, for any history Hr consisting











MLRP, S3 is strictly increasing and S1 is strictly decreasing. Thus, there must exist r > 1
44such that qr
1/qr














2Pr(S2|V1)] > η/2. (28)
Next, ﬁx any ǫ > 0. Note that there exists δ > 0 such that if q1
2 > 1 − δ then ask
r =
E[V |Hr,buy] = qr
2V2 + qr










1Pr(S|V3)] < η/2. (29)














Since S2 sells initially and qr
1/qr
3 < η/2 < 1, it follows from the last inequality that S2 is
buy herding at Hr at an ask price that belongs to the interval (V2,V2 + ǫ).
Next, as shown in part (a), there must also exist a history Ht with t = r+b following Hr
such that there is buy herding at any history Hτ, r ≤ τ ≤ t, and E[V |Ht] > V3 − ǫ.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We shall prove the two results for the case of buy herding; the proof for the buy contrarian
case is analogous and will be omitted.
Proof of part 1(a) of Proposition 6. Let βi and σi be respectively the probability
of a buy and the probability of a sale in the transparent world at any date τ = r,...,r +
b + s. Also, let βi,o and σi,o be the analogous probabilities in the opaque world. Then
















































Therefore, E[V |Ht] − Eo[V |Ht] has the same sign as
qr
2qr







Suppose that S buy herds at Hr. Then, by Lemma 9, we have
qr
2qr





1[β1Pr(S|V3) − β3Pr(S|V1)] > 0.
(31)
By simple computation we also have
β2β1,o − β2,oβ1 =  [β1Pr(S|V2) − β2Pr(S|V1)],
β3β1,o − β3,oβ1 =  [β1Pr(S|V3) − β3Pr(S|V1)],
β3β2,o − β3,oβ2 =  [β2Pr(S|V3) − β3Pr(S|V2)].
(32)













1[β3β1,o − β3,oβ1] > 0. (33)
45To prove 1(a) in Proposition 6 suppose that s = 0 (thus t = b). Then by expanding (30)

























































Also, by (25) and (32) the ﬁrst and the third terms in (34) are negative and the second
is positive. Therefore, by (33), (35), and (36), E[V |Ht] − Eo[V |Ht] > 0 for s = 0. This
completes the proof of part 1(a) of Proposition 6.45
Proof of part 1(b) of Proposition 6. Suppose that b = 0 and s = 1 (t = r + 1). Since
S buys in the transparent world, E[V |S,Hr]−bid
r > 0. Simple computations analogous to









Also, by the deﬁnition of σi and σi we have
σ3σ2,o − σ3,oσ2 = − [σ2Pr(S|V3) − σ3Pr(S|V2)],
σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1 = − [σ1Pr(S|V3) − σ3Pr(S|V1)],
σ2σ1,o − σ2,oσ1 = − [σ1Pr(S|V2) − σ2Pr(S|V1)].
(38)













1[σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1] < 0. (39)
Since the LHS of (39) is the same as the expression in (30) when b = 0 and s = 1, it follows
that in this case E[V |Ht] − Eo[V |Ht] < 0.46 This completes the proof of this part.





























45Note that MLRP is assumed in the above proof in order to establish conditions (35), and (36). When
b = 1 and s = 0 these conditions, and hence MLRP, is not needed as E[V |Ht] − Eo[V |Ht] > 0 follows
immediately from (30) and (33).
46This claim also does not require the assumption of MLRP.
46Fix s and let b → ∞. Then since by (25) and (32) β3β2,o > β3,oβ2 we have that the second
term in (40) converges to qr
3qr
2(σ3σ2n)s as b → ∞. Also, since β3 > β2 > β1 it follows
that β2,oβ1 < β2,oβ3 and β3,oβ2 > β3,0β1. The former, together with (25) and (32), imply
that the ﬁrst term in (40) vanishes as b → ∞. The latter, together with (25) and (32),
imply that β3β2,o > β3,oβ1; therefore, using (25) and (32) again, the last term in (40) also
vanishes. Consequently, as b → ∞ the expression in (40) converges to qr
3qr
2(σ3σ2n)s. Since
(σ3σ2n)s > 0 and E[V |Ht]−Eo[V |Ht] has the same sign as the expression in (40), the claim
in 1(c) of the proposition is established.
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– Supplementary Material –
There are results in the paper that were not fully discussed or proven fully. This supple-
mentary material contains what was omitted or mentioned. We organize this appendix in
the same way as the sections in the main paper.
B Supplementary Material for Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Observe ﬁrst that
E[V |S,H


































































1(Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V1) + q
t
2 (Pr(S|V3) − Pr(S|V2))
￿
.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
This follows by Lemma 1: By the symmetry assumption on the priors (q1
1 = q1
3), the (2) is
negative (positive) at t = 1 if and only if (Pr(S|V3)−Pr(S|V1))(q1
2 +2q1
1)q1
3 is less (greater)
than 0; the latter is equivalent to S having a negative (positive) bias.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The claim follows from E[V |Ht] − E[V ] = V[(1 − qt
1 − qt
3) + 2qt
3] − V = V(qt
3 − qt
1).
1B.4 Proof of Lemma 9









































= q1q2 (β1Pr(S|V2) − β2Pr(S|V1)) + q2q3 (β3Pr(S|V2) − β2Pr(S|V3))
+2 q3 (q1 (β1Pr(S|V3) − β3Pr(S|V1)) + q2 (β2Pr(S|V3) − β3Pr(S|V2))).
B.5 Necessity of the Bounds on Noise Trading
In the paper we claimed that the bounds on noise trading are also necessary for some cases.
The following proposition outlines these scenarios.
Proposition 3a
(i) Suppose that S buy herds and that there is at most one U-shaped signal.
Then   < min{ i, s
bh}, where  i is deﬁned in Lemma 8 and  s
bh is deﬁned in (12).
(ii) Suppose that S acts as a buy contrarian and there is at most one Hill-shaped signal.
Then   < min{ i, s
bc}, where  i is deﬁned in Lemma 8 and  s
bc is deﬁned in (13).
Proof: We shall prove (i); the proof of (ii) is analogous. Assume S buy herds. Then S
sells initially. It follows from Lemma 5 that   <  i.
To show that   <  s
bh ﬁrst note that by Proposition 2, S must be nU-shaped. Next
consider the diﬀerent possibilities separately.
Case A. There is no signal S′  = S such that Pr(S′|V3) > Pr(S′|V2). Then it must be
that  2(S′) = 1 for all S′ and therefore it must be that   <  s
bh = 1.
Case B. There is a signal S′  = S such that Pr(S′|V3) > Pr(S′|V2). Since S is U-shaped it
must be that Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2) and Pr(S′′|V3) ≤ Pr(S′′|V2) for S′′  = S,S′. This implies
that  2(S′′) = 1 and hence,  2(S′) =  s
bh.
Now there are two cases. First, if  2(S′) also equals 1 then clearly  s
bh = 1 and the
claim is trivially true.
Second, assume that  2(S′) =  s
bh < 1. Since S buy herds at Ht, to show that   <
min{ i, s
bh} it suﬃces to show that S′ also buys whenever S buys (the alternative is that S′
does not buy so that  2(S′) = 1 >  s
bh). When S′ buys, E[V |S′,Ht]−ask
t > 0. Suppose S′
does not buy. As the sign of E[V |S′,Ht] − ask
t is given by equation (3), it must then hold
2that
q1q2 [β1Pr(S′|V2) − β2Pr(S′|V1)] + q2q3[β2Pr(S′|V3) − β3Pr(S′|V2)]
+2 q1q3 [β1Pr(S′|V3) − β3Pr(S′|V1)] ≤ 0.
(B-1)





By Proposition 1 this implies that S′ does not sell. By supposition S′ does not buy and




2. This, together with (B-2) imply that the ﬁrst and the third term in (B-1)
are positive. Furthermore, the second term has the same sign as
γ(Pr(S
′|V3) − Pr(S
′|V2)) +  (Pr(S|V2)Pr(S
′|V3) − Pr(S|V3)Pr(S
′|V2)). (B-3)
By (B-2) the ﬁrst term in the last expression is positive; furthermore, since S is nU, we
have m2 = Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2). Since  2(S′) < 1 we must have that M2(S′) < 1 is
negative. But − M2(S′) is the second term in the last expression and it is thus positive.
Consequently, (B-3) is positive. Therefore, the second term in (B-1) must also be positive.
Therefore, S′ must be buying at any Ht at which S buys and thus  s
bh < 1 is unique.
C Supplementary Material for Section 6
Proof of Lemma 5: (i) By standard results on MLRP and stochastic dominance it must
be that E[V |Sl] < E[V |Sh]. By a similar reasoning, at any history Ht, E[V |Sl,Ht] <







To show this note ﬁrst that Pr(V |Ht,S) = Pr(V |S)Pr(Ht|V )/
P
V ′∈V Pr(V ′|S)Pr(Ht|V ′).





implies the MLRP condition (C-4) at any Ht:
Pr(Sl|Vl)Pr(Sh|Vh) > Pr(Sl|Vh)Pr(Sh|Vl)



















⇔ Pr(Vl|Ht,Sl)Pr(Vh|Ht,Sh) > Pr(Vh|Ht,Sl)Pr(Vl|Ht,Sh).
3(ii) Suppose contrary to the claim, that an informed trader with signal S1 does not sell
at some history Ht. Then by part (i) no informed trader sells at Ht. This implies that
at history Ht, bid
t = E[V |Ht]. But since, by part (i), E[V |Ht] exceeds E[V |S1,Ht], we
have bid
t > E[V |S1,Ht]. Hence, an informed trader with signal S1 sells at Ht. This is a
contradiction.
The proof that informed traders with signal S3 always buy is analogous.
(iii) First we show that Pr(S1|V1) > Pr(S1|V3). Suppose otherwise; thus Pr(S1|V1) ≤
Pr(S1|V3). Then the two MLRP conditions Pr(S1|V1)Pr(S2|V3) > Pr(S2|V1)Pr(S1|V3) and
Pr(S1|V1)Pr(S3|V3) > Pr(S3|V1)Pr(S1|V3) imply respectively that Pr(S2|V1) < Pr(S2|V3)




i=1 Pr(Si|V1). But this contradicts
P3
i=1 Pr(Si|Vj) = 1 for every j.
The same argument can be applied to show that Pr(S1|V1) > Pr(S1|V2) and Pr(S1|V2) >
Pr(S1|V3), and also in the reverse direction for Pr(S3|V1) < Pr(S3|V2) < Pr(S3|V3).
(iv) Consider any arbitrary history Ht and any two values Vl < Vh. By (ii) type S1
always sells, type S3 always buys. There are thus two cases for a buy at Ht: either only
S3 types buy or S2 and S3 types buy. In the former case, βt
i = γ +  Pr(S3|Vi). As S3 is
strictly increasing, there exits ǫ > 0 such that βt
h − βt
l > ǫ. In the latter case,
βt
h − βt
l =  (Pr(S3|Vh) + Pr(S2|Vh) − Pr(S3|Vl) − Pr(S2|Vl))
=  (1 − Pr(S1|Vh) − (1 − Pr(S1|Vl))) =  (Pr(S1|Vl) − Pr(S1|Vh)).
Since S1 is strictly decreasing, there exists an ǫ > 0 such that βt
h − βt
l > ǫ.
By a similar reasoning it can be shown that there must exist ǫ > 0 so that σt
l −σt
h > ǫ.
D Supplementary Material for Section 8
Proposition 6a Assume MLRP. Consider any ﬁnite history Hr = (a1,...,ar−1) at which
the priors in the two markets coincide: qr
i = qr
i,o for i = 1,2,3. Suppose that Hr is followed
by s ≥ 0 sales; denote this history by Ht = (a1,...,ar+s−1). If σ1/σ3 ≥ σ1,o/σ3,o then
E[V |Ht] < Eo[V |Ht].
Proof: First, note that, by (33) in the proof of Proposition 7, we have
σ3σ2,o − σ3,oσ2 = − 2ρ23
12 +  γ(Pr(S|V2) − Pr(S|V3)) < 0
σ2σ1,o − σ2,oσ1 > σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1
(D-5)
Also, since for herding we require E[V |S,H1] < bid














1[σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1] > 0.
But then by (D-5) we have
σ2σ1,o − σ2,oσ1 > 0. (D-6)
4Since E[V |Ht]−Eo[V |Ht] has the same sign as the expression in (29), by simple expansion




























































τ=0(σ3σ2,o)s−1−τ(σ3,oσ2)τ [σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1]. (D-7)


























































Also, since E[V |S,Ht] − bid
























[σ3σ1,o − σ3,oσ1] < 0. (D-10)




σ3,o, (D-6), (D-8) and (D-9), that the
expression in (D-7) is negative. Thus E[V |Ht] − Eo[V |Ht] < 0 and the result follows.
5E Supplementary Material for Section 9
We prove Lemma 7 and Theorem 3 of Section 9 in a more general set-up than that described
in the main body of the paper. This more general set-up is of independent interest as it
allows for uncertainties other than those relating to the value of of the asset.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that there are N ≥ 3 states, where each state represents all ex-
ogenous variables that might inﬂuence the prices, and assume that there are N signals.
Without any loss of generality, order the states such that V1 ≤ V2 ≤ ... ≤ VN, where
Vj denotes the value of the asset in state j = 1,...,N. Note that here, in contrast to
the model in the text, we allow for the possibility that the asset has the same values in
diﬀerent states to reﬂect the idea that there may be factors, other than the value of the
asset, that may inﬂuence prices. In particular, we assume that the asset can have at most
I ≤ N diﬀerent values. We denote the (public) probability of state j at date t by qt
j and
the likelihood of signal S in state j by Pr(S|j).
We also restrict ourselves to a symmetric structure with respect to the values and the
initial beliefs on the distribution of values of the asset, as in the three states model of the
paper. Formally, we assume that the values are distributed on a symmetrical grid; thus
Vj ∈ {0,V,...,(I − 1)V} for all j = 1,...,N and V > 0. Further, for any r = 1,...,I, let
Cr := {j|Vj = (r −1)V} be the set of states with valuations (r −1)V and cr := |Cr| be the
number of states with valuation (r − 1)V. Assume (i) q1
j = q1
N+1−j for every j ≤ N/2 and
(ii) cr = cI+1−r for every r ≤ I/2.
We say that signal S is negatively biased if for all j≤ N
2 we have Pr(S|j) < Pr(S|N+1−j).
Notice that when cr = 1 for all r (hence I = N), this setup is identical to the one in
the main text.
We ﬁrst prove that any informed type buys initially if it has a negative bias and if there
are enough noise traders.
Lemma II Let S be negatively biased. Then E[V |S] < E[V ]. Hence, there exists  i ∈ (0,1]
such that S sells at the initial history if   <  i.
Proof of Lemma II: Without loss of generality, we present the proof only for the case
when the number of value classes I is even so that I = 2k for some integer k. Then by the
symmetry of the prior E[V ] = V(2k − 1)/2. Also, E[V |S] = V
P2k
r=1(r − 1)Pr(r|S), where
Pr(r|S) =
P
j∈Cr Pr(j|S). Thus, we need to show
2k X
r=1




Next, since (a) Pr(S|j) > Pr(S|N + 1 − j), (b) q1
j = q1
N+1−j and (c) cr = cI+1−r, we have
Pr(r|S) > Pr(2k + 1 − r|S) for all r < (2k + 1)/2. Using this and
PR








(k − 1) +
2k X
r=k+1







Then by (E-11) it is suﬃcient to show that
k X
r=1
(r − 1)Pr(r|S) +
2k X
r=k+1




But the second term on the left hand side of (E-13) satisﬁes the following:
2k X
r=k+1










Pr(r|S) + (k − 1)Pr(k + 1|S) + [(k − 1)Pr(k + 2|S) + Pr(k − 1|S)]



























This demonstrates that (E-13) holds. Hence we must have that E[V |S] < E[V ]. To complete
the proof of the lemma we also need to show that there exists  i ∈ (0,1] such that E[V |S] <
bid
1 if   <  i. As in Lemma 5 this follows immediately from E[V |S] < E[V ] and from
lim →0 E[V ] − bid
1 = 0. This completes the proof of Lemma II.
Next, we turn to the switching of behaviour. In our main characterization results for
the three state – three signal case to obtain switching by a herding type we assumed that
the signal is more likely when the value is highest than when the asset has the middle
value, and for the switching by a contrarian type we assumed that the signal is more likely
when the value is lowest than when the asset has the middle value. The analogue of those
conditions to the current setting with N states and I liquidation values are the following:
Pr(S|j) > Pr(S|i) for all j ∈ CI, i ∈ CI−1 (E-14)
Pr(S|j) < Pr(S|i) for all j ∈ C1, i ∈ C2 (E-15)
7In the three state case, a negatively biased signal that satisﬁes (E-14) is nU-shaped a
negatively biased signal that satisﬁes (E-15) is nHill-shaped.
Next we show that if the probability of informed trading is suﬃciently small, then
conditions (E-14) and (E-15) can be used to establish the following.
Lemma III
(i) Let S satisfy (E-14). Then there exists  s
bh ∈ (0,1] such that βt
iPr(S|j)−βt
jPr(S|i) > 0,
for all i ∈ CI−1,j ∈ CI, t and Ht.
(ii) Let S satisfy (E-15). Then there exists  s
bc ∈ (0,1] such that βt
iPr(S|j)−βt
jPr(S|i) > 0,
for all i ∈ C1,j ∈ C2, t and Ht.
Proof of Lemma III: We show (i); the argument for (ii) follows analogously. Fix any
j ∈ CI and i ∈ CI−1. For any date t and history Ht, let St be a set of signal types
that buy at history Ht. Since βt
iPr(S|j) − βt
jPr(S|i) = (γ +  
P
S′∈St




Pr(S′|j))Pr(S|i), it follows that βt
iPr(S|j) − βt
jPr(S|i) > 0 is equivalent to














By (E-14), the left hand side of (E-16) is positive. Also, since there is a ﬁnite number of
signals, the expression in parentheses on right hand side of (E-16) is uniformly bounded
in t. Therefore, there must exist  s
bh ∈ (0,1] such that for any   <  s
bh (E-16) holds for all
t and Ht.
Next, we state out ﬁrst characterization result in this general set-up (it is equivalent to
Lemma 7 when I = N).
Lemma IV
(i) Suppose S is negatively biased, satisﬁes (E-14) and let the following condition hold
∀ǫ > 0 ∃ H




j < ǫ for all j ∈ CI−1 ∪ CI and i  ∈ CI−1 ∪ CI. (E-17)
Then there exists a  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S buy herds if   <  bh.
(ii) Suppose S is negatively biased, satisﬁes (E-15) and let the following condition hold
∀ǫ > 0 ∃ H




j < ǫ for all j ∈ C1 ∪ C2 and i  ∈ C1 ∪ C2. (E-18)
Then there exists a  bc ∈ (0,1] such that S is a buy contrarian if   <  bc.
Proof of Lemma IV: We show part (i); part (ii) follows analogously. Assume that   <
 bh ≡ min{ i
bh, s
bh}, where  i
bh and  s
bh are respectively the bounds on the size of the
informed traders given in Lemmas II and III. Since S is negatively biased and   <  bh, by
Lemma II, S sells at the initial history.
8Analogously to Lemma 9, by simple calculations, it can be shown that for any history Ht,
E[V |S,Ht] − ask


















j is the probability that the valuation is (r − 1)V, for all r. Consider
















Since   <  s
bh, by Lemma III, there exists an η > 0 such that βt
iPr(S|j)−βt
jPr(S|i) > η for
all i ∈ CI−1,j ∈ CI. Thus












Furthermore, note that E[V |Ht] > ρt
I−1V(I − 2) + ρt
IV(I − 1). Also, by the symmetries
assumed it must be that E[V ] ≤ V(I − 2). Therefore, E[V |Ht] − E[V ] > ρt
IV − (1 − ρt
I −
ρt
I−1)V(I − 2) = V
P
j∈CI qj − V(I − 2)
P
j/ ∈CI∪CI−1 qj. This together with (E-17) and
ﬁniteness of the state space imply that there exists a history Ht such that the following
two conditions hold:
E[V |H















iPr(S|i)) > −η. (E-23)
The latter, together with (E-21), imply that at such a history (E-19)> 0. Thus, by (E-22),
type S buy herds at Ht. This completes the proof of Lemma IV.
Notice that the above result is the analogue of Lemma 4 for our current set-up with N
and I values. Also, properties (E-17) and (E-18) are respectively analogous to (3) and (4)
for our set-up.
As with (3) and (4), conditions (E-17) and (E-18) are assumptions on endogenous
variables. One restriction on the information structure that ensures these properties is
MLRP. In particular, with MLRP one can show (as in the three states case) that the
probability of a buy is increasing in the liquidation values and the probability of a sale is
decreasing in the liquidation values; these relationship in turn ensure (E-17) and (E-18).
9Lemma V Suppose that the signals satisfy MLRP and assume that S1 < ... < SN. Then
there exists δ < 1 such that for all i,j with i < j and all t, we have βt
i/βt
j < δ and σt
j/σt
i < δ.
Proof of Lemma V: We will show only βt
1 < βt
2 < ... < βt
N; the result for σi follows
analogously. To show the former, observe that with MLRP signals, expectations are ordered
in signals: E[V |Ht,Si] > E[V |Ht,Sj] if i > j. Thus, if signal type Si buys, so will all Sl > Si
and for any t and any i < j, βt
i − βt






















Pr(Sl|j), for some k ≤ N.
Since MLRP implies First Order Stochastic Dominance and there are a ﬁnite number of




l=1 Pr(Sl|j) > ǫ for all
k and i < j. But then βt
i/βt
j < 1 − ǫ. This completes the proof of Lemma V.
Theorem 3a Assume that signals satisfy MLRP and let signal S be negatively biased.
(a) If Pr(S|VN−1) < Pr(S|VN) then there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S buy herds if   <  bh.
(b) If Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2) there exists  bh ∈ (0,1] such that S is a buy contrarian if   <  bh.
Note that Theorem 3a is more general than Theorem 3 as it applies to the general setup
depicted in this supplementary material.
Proof of Theorem 3a. Part (a): It remains to be shown that histories exists such that
(E-17) holds. Consider the inﬁnite path consisting of only buys at every date. By MLRP
and Lemma V, there must exist δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every Ht and for any i and j with
i < j, we have βt
i/βt















k, it then follows that qt
i/qt
j converges to zero
along this inﬁnite path of buys, for all i / ∈ CI−1∪CI and j ∈ CI−1∪CI. This together with
Lemma IV (i) concludes the proof for the existence of buy herding.
Part (b) follows analogously.
F Supplementary Material for Section 10
In this section we show how AZ’s composition uncertainty can be accommodated within
our N-state framework of the last section and why the types that herd in this set-up also
have U-shaped signals.
In AZ’s set-up there are three liquidation values 0,1/2 and 1, as in their basic example.
When the liquidation values are 0 and 1, there are two levels of informativeness of the
market W and P. Thus, there are ﬁve states (0,W),(0,P),1/2,(1,P) and (1,W), and
we enumerate them by 1,2,3,4 and 5, respectively. Thus, in terms of the notation from
10the previous section of this supplementary material, I = 3,V = 1/2 and N = 5. We also
denote the states with valuation i by Ci. Therefore, C0 = {(0,W),(0,P)}, C1/2 = {1/2},
and C1 = {(1,W),(1,P)}.
In terms of the private information of the traders, AZ’s description is as follows. There
are two kinds of informed traders. All have a common partition of the liquidation values
given by {(0,1),1/2}. When values 0 or 1 are realized, the two types have diﬀerent preci-
sions with respect to the two valuations. Speciﬁcally, high “quality” type h has precision ph
and low “quality” type l has precision pl, with 1 ≥ ph > pl > 1/2. Thus, in this model there
ﬁve signals. We denote the signal that conﬁrms valuation 1/2 by S3, and let S1 and S5
be the signals that high quality traders receive and S2 and S4 those that low quality types
receive. Finally, the proportion of diﬀerent kind of traders depends on the informativeness
of the market; in particular, the likelihood of quality type i = h,l occurring in market j is
given by  
j
i, i ∈ {h,l} and j ∈ {W,P}, with  W
h +  W
l =  P
h +  P
l =  .
Using our notation, we can then describe the information structure as follows:
(0,W) (0,P) 1/2 (1,P) (1,W)







  ph 0
 P
h
  (1 − ph)
 W
h







  pl 0
 P
l
  (1 − pl)
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l
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h







To demonstrate buy herding consider signals S1 and S2 (sell-herding arguments are
analogous and involve considering S4 and S5). These signals are U-shaped in the sense
that Pr(Si|j) > Pr(Si|k) for every i = 1,2 and j ∈ C0 ∪ C1 and k ∈ C1/2. By appealing to
the arguments of the previous section, the U-shaped nature of signals S1 and S2 allows us
to establish buy herding as follows.
Take the case of S1 and suppose that S1 does not buy herd. Note also that S1 is
negatively biased (in the generalized sense deﬁned in the last section: Pr(S1|j) > Pr(S1|6−j)
for each j = 1,2) and satisﬁes (E-14). Therefore, if (E-17) holds, Lemma IV applies and
types S1 buy herd when there are a suﬃcient amount of noise traders; a contradiction. The
last step is to construct histories that satisfy (E-17).
The proof of (E-17) is as in Proposition 3. (Since S3 is a Hill shaped signal, it cor-
responds to the case D2 of that proof.47) Speciﬁcally, one constructs a two-stage history.
47This sub-case proves the existence of the histories that yield (E-17) for the case with two U/Hill shaped
signals with opposing biases and a Hill/U shaped signal with a zero bias and it is the case for which our
results formally subsume AZ’s example of event uncertainty.
11During the ﬁrst stage, the actions are such that qt
i/qt
j for i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1/2 decrease while
qt
i/qt
j, for i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1 do not change (during this stage the actions correspond to those
that S3 will take). The second stage involves buys only. During this stage qt
i/qt
j for each
i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1 decrease while qt
i/qt
j for i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1/2 may increase. Finally, the length
of the two stages are chosen appropriately so that (E-17) holds (if the second stage is long
enough then qt
i/qt
j for each i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1 is suﬃciently small and if the length of the ﬁrst
stage is suﬃciently long relative to the second stage then qt
i/qt
j for each i ∈ C0, j ∈ C1/2 is
suﬃciently small).
G Supplementary Material for Section 11
Simple History Dependence. The order of trades and traders does not aﬀect the price
path as long as the model primitives do not allow any type of trader to change behaviour.
Clearly, herding or contrarian behaviour involve such a change of behaviour; changes from
buying to holding or selling to holding also qualify as a change of behaviour.
Without changes in behaviour, it suﬃces to study the order imbalance (number of buys
minus number of sales) to determine prices, but with changes, the order of arrival matters
a great deal. Consider the following numerical example48 of an MLRP signal structure with
an nU-shaped S2

















  = 1209
1600,
V = (0,10,20), and
Pr(V ) = (1/6,2/3,1/6).
For illustrative purposes, assume that the ﬁrst ﬁfteen traders are all informed and each
signal Si, i = 1,2,3, is received by ﬁve of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen traders. Next, we compare the
price paths for diﬀerent arrival orders of these traders.
Series 1: The arrival order is 5×S1–5 ×S2–5×S3 (meaning the ﬁrst ﬁve receive S1,
the next ﬁve S2 and the last ﬁve S3). The S1 types, who move ﬁrst, all sell and thus the
price drops. The S2 types also sell and the S3 types buy. Computations show that after
these 15 trades the public expectation will drop from 10 to .15.
Series 2: 5×S1–5×S3–5×S2. Here the outcome is the same as in the previous series
with S1 traders selling, S3 types’ buying and ﬁnally the S2 types selling. The public
expectation also drops from 10 to .15.
Series 3: 5×S3–5×S2–5×S1. The S3 traders move ﬁrst and buy. The S2 types will
now behave diﬀerently from the previous two series and will be buy-herding. The public
48We chose the numbers so that there can be herding after a small number of trades.
12expectation now rises to about 13.5. Finally, the ﬁve S1 type sell, and then the public
expectation drops to 10.31.
The diﬀerence between the outcome for Series 3 with those of Series 1 and 2 illustrates
how the arrival order of traders matters: since there are S2 types who trade, this type’s
change in trading-mode (from selling to buying) strongly aﬀects the price-path.
Note, however, that even if there are no S2-types directly involved in trading, the market
maker has to consider the possibility that this type trades and thus has to account for this
type’s change of trading mode. To illustrate this, we next compare the outcome when the
same number of buys and sales occurs, but in diﬀerent orders.
Series 4: 20 buys followed by 20 sales. After 20 buys, the public expectation
is 15.36, after 20 subsequent sales it is 3.12.
Series 4: 20 sales followed by 20 buys. After 20 sales, the public expectation
is 1.16 × 10−13, after 20 subsequent buys it is 10.0064.
In summary, the S2-type can change trading modes in response to observing the order
ﬂow; thus the order ﬂow aﬀects prices and the frequency of diﬀerent types of future trades.
In the short run, the ﬂuctuations may thus be inﬂuenced by the precise order of trades.
Price Sensitivity. To further elaborate on the price sensitivity induced by herding, we
simulate price paths (Figure 1) using the following MLRP speciﬁcation:
 s
bh = 0.7656 ≡  bh
 i = 0.9215
V = (0,10,20),
Pr(V ) = (1/10,4/5,1/10), and



















In the left panel, there are two relevant price paths: the ﬁrst (in gray) is for a setting
with   =  bh − ǫ, ǫ = 1/10,000; in other words, there is just enough noise so that herding
is possible. The second price path (in red) is for   =  bh so that there cannot be herding.49
The entry series for the graph is as follows: ﬁrst, there is a long series of S3 types, who all
buy; this is followed by a group of S2 types and eventually by some S1 types. The point
when S2 types start entering is clearly marked; the S1 types enter at the point when both
curves peak. The point at which herding starts is marked too.
The series is constructed so that there are S3 types who enter during herding. When
the S2 types enter, in the herding case, they buy, in the no-herding case, they hold. Even
with holds, however, prices increase (this is due to the U-shaped csd).50
49The third price path (in blue) is for the case of the opaque economy as described in the Section 8. For
the opaque case the diﬀerences in prices for the two levels of   are negligible.
50The same simulation for the case of the opaque economy as described in the Section 8 results in S2
types selling and prices falling for both levels of  .
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In the middle panel we plot prices for the same speciﬁcations, this time for a random
sequence of traders; both series have the same sequence of traders but due to herding their
actions may diﬀer.51 In the right panel we plot the diﬀerence of the two rational price-series
from the middle panel. As the series with herding-prices has more noise (because   <  bh),
initially, the price for the no-herding series is above the price of the herd series. Once herding
starts (here after 8 trades), and once an S2 type enters, this relation ﬂips, illustrating that
due to herding prices move stronger in the direction of the herd than in the no-herding case.
Does Herding Hamper Learning? To explore this issue, we use Monte Carlo sim-
ulations and compare the two scenarios outlined when discussing price sensitivity. That
is, for the ﬁrst series, there is just enough noise so that buy-herding can be triggered,
  =  bh − ǫ, ǫ ≈ 1/10,000. In the second series, herding cannot occur, because there is
too much informed trading,   =  s
bh. We will refer to prices in the ﬁrst setting as herding-
prices, irrespective of whether or not herding actually occurred; we refer to prices in the
second setting as no-herding prices. Comparing the speeds of convergence for our two sets
of simulations we note the following two observations:
1. if the true value is V1 or V2, then herding-prices converge slower;
2. if the true value is V3, then convergence with herding is faster.
These observations are based on the following: For the simulations we again used the
speciﬁcation of the parameters given by (G-24). Fixing the true liquidation values, we
then drew 650 traders at random (noise and informed) assuming that  bh ≈ .766. Since
the proportion of the informed agents   is large — approximately three quarters for both
simulations — the 650 trades are almost always suﬃcient to obtain convergence to the true
51There is also a series for the the opaque economy (Section 8) which, not surprisingly, is entirely below
both rational series. Again, the opaque economy price series for   =  bh and   =  bh−ǫ are almost identical.
14Figure 2
The Diﬀerence in Speeds of Convergence.
Each graph plots the diﬀerence of the negative of the average log-distance of the transaction prices of
herding and no-herding case. An up-sloping line thus indicates that for any t herding-prices are further
from the true value than no-herding prices. All graphs are scaled to ﬁt the page. The underlying signal
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value. Next, we computed the time series of the transaction prices for both the herding and
the no-herding case, and then recorded for each t and for both cases the absolute distance of
the transaction price from the true value (which we know). We then repeated this procedure
a large number of times, and calculated for each t and for each case the average distance
from the true value. Since prices converge to the true value, these average distances decline
in t. In the simulations, this distance declines approximately exponentially to zero. Thus
the slope of the logarithm of the average distance measures the speed of convergence.
As the ﬁnal step, we subtract at each t the log-averages for the no-herding from the
herding series. A positive number indicates that the herding series is slower, i.e. that the
average herding price is further away from the true value. Figure 2 plots these diﬀerences
and the graphs are striking; they conﬁrm our two observations mentioned above.52
To see the intuition for the these observations compare the eﬀects of buy-herding on the
herding and no-herding prices. First, when buy-herding occurs, S2 types buy in the herding
case and thus there are more buys with herding than in the no-herding case. Second, in
the case of a buy, prices in the herding case tend to be higher than in the no-herding case.
Since the no-herding prices here are the similar or higher than the ones that arise in the
opaque economy of Section 8 (only S3 types buy in both cases), this second eﬀect follows
from the same reasoning used in the previous simulation to explain why, in the case of a
52We have also made a formal analysis by regressing the log-distance on time and, using the Chow test,
checking if one slope is steeper than the other. The results were highly signiﬁcant.
15buy, prices in the rational world, when herding starts, exceed those in the opaque economy
(see Proposition 6(1a)). Third, when there is a sale, prices in the herding and no-herding
cases are almost identical and unaﬀected by buy-herding. This is because in both cases
only S1 types sell: in the herding case this is so by deﬁnition and in the no-herding case,
the S2 type’s expectation is almost equal to the ask-price (expression (11) is almost zero)
and thus larger than the bid-price.53
Now it follows from the above that if the true value is V1 or V2, herding prices con-
verge slower: during herding, herd-buys move prices away from the true value by a larger
magnitude and there are more such buys than in the no-herding case (sales have a similar
eﬀect in both cases). If, however, the true value is V3 then once herding starts, prices in
the herding-case move up more strongly because of the ﬁrst two eﬀects and thus they move
faster towards the true value. This leads to a higher speed of convergence in the herding
case. Figure 2 documents these three cases.
The Probability of the Fastest Herd. The shortest sequence of trades that leads to
buy-herding is one with only buys; this is the “fastest” herd. We now want get a sense of
how likely this sequence is. Keeping the csd and the prior distribution ﬁxed but varying
the proportion of informed trading, we compute ﬁrst how many buys are needed for buy-
herding to begin, and then we determine how likely this sequence of buys is. The same
type of analysis clearly applies to sell-herding.
As was explained before, S2 types buy at any history Ht if the expression in (11)
is positive. As the amount of informed trading increases from 0 to  bh, there are then
two opposing eﬀects. First, as noise decreases, the positive term in expression (11) (the
ﬁrst term) becomes smaller. This implies that for any history, the diﬀerence between the
market maker’s and the S2 type’s expectation becomes smaller; thus to get buy-herding one
needs more buys. Second, as noise decreases, the informational content of past behaviour
(public information) improves and this makes herding more likely. Formally, the second







∂  = (Pr(S3|V1) − Pr(S3|Vi))/βi
2 and thus, since S1’s csd is
decreasing,
∂(β1/βi)
∂  < 0.
While we do not have an analytical result on the net eﬀect of increasing   from 0
to  b, in all numerical examples that we computed the second eﬀect dominates. Thus
53The herding and no-herding price paths may also diﬀer even if no buy-herding occurs (if S2 types
behave the same way in the two cases) because the proportions of informed trading   are diﬀerent for
the two cases. In particular, when S2 types do not buy-herd, since   is smaller in the herding case, each
price-movement in the herding-price series is smaller than than in the no-herding case, and as a result speed
of convergence is slower in the former series. However, since for the simulations the diﬀerence between the
values of   is small (ǫ = 1/10,000), the consequence of this eﬀect is small relative to the ﬁrst two eﬀects
mentioned above.
16Figure 3
Trades needed for Herding the Probabilities for these trades.
The left panel plots the value of expression (11) as a function of  , with   ∈ (0, bh), and of no-herd buys b.
Whenever the bend curve crosses the 0-surface from below, herding is triggered. The middle panel computes
the minimum integer number of no-herd buys that would trigger herding as a function of noise level  .
The right panel computes two probabilities: the ﬁrst is the probability of having exactly the threshold
number of buys at the beginning of trade (the thresholds are taken from the middle panel) conditional on
the true state being V3. The second probability is the unconditional likelihood of this threshold number.
The plots in the right panel are functions of the  . The signal distribution that underlies these plots is









































for V = V3
unconditional
probability
Equation (11) Minimum b given   Probability of b given  
as noise trading declines (  increases to  bh) it takes fewer buys to trigger buy-herding.
Figure 3 plots the minimum number of such consecutive time-zero buys needed to trigger
buy-herding for our simulations. As the amount of noise decreases, ex ante it gets more
likely that these consecutive buy-trades occur. (Figure 3’s right panel illustrates these
probabilities.)
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